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Where does the balance of power lie in a policy-making institution with an external agenda 
setter, legislators, and lobbies? In a multiple round majority rule game with sophisticated 
actors, we show that the agenda setter obtains its most preferred policy outcome even if all 
lobbies and legislators prefer the status quo to the proposal (i.e., the proposal lies in the 
covered set). A lobby with the ability to recruit supermajorities can counterbalance this 
power. If contributions are conditional on the entire voting profile, such a ‘transnational 
lobby’ can veto any proposal at no cost. If contributions are conditional on the votes of each 
recipient legislator, the transnational lobby has only to possess a greater willingness to pay 
than the median national lobby to achieve this result. We use our formal model to explain 
external tariff policies in the European Union following the creation of an internal market. 
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 Uncovered Power: External Agenda Setting,





This paper provides a game-theoretic demonstration that, in an institutional setting mir-
roring the European Union (EU) trade policy process,1 an external (non-voting and ￿xed
a priori) agenda setter has unlimited power when voting is according to majority rule and
there exists no lobby organized across multiple voting districts (nations, in the case of the
EU). We further show that this power can be eliminated by the adoption of unanimity
voting or counterbalanced by a lobby capable of in￿ uencing multiple legislators.
Although potential applications and extensions are diverse,2 our theoretical argument is
motivated by a lingering empirical puzzle. With the implementation of the Single European
Act (SEA) on December 31, 1992, the creation of an internal market within the EU was
largely complete. At the time, little attention was paid by negotiators to the implications
of the SEA for external trade policy. Many scholars, however, predicted the emergence of
a "fortress Europe" that would erect heightened trade barriers against non-EU countries,
particularly in light of the bleak macroeconomic context of the early 1990s EU. Instead, EU
trade policy underwent dramatic liberalization. Why?
This paper argues that an explanation can be found in the particular form of the EU
trade policy apparatus. This process was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1980, well
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1In referencing the European institutions that govern trade policy, the term "European Community"
would be technically correct. However, we follow the vast majority of the literature in employing the
￿European Union￿label.
2See, for instance, Bernheim and Console Battilana (2006); Console Battilana and Shepsle (2006); and
Console Battilana (2006).
2before the advent of common external tari⁄s. Under the Treaty, an external agenda setter
(the Commission) must ￿rst propose changes to tari⁄ policy. These proposals are then
voted upon by legislators (the Council) representing individual states, subject to the e⁄orts
of lobbyists to sway decisions. We show game-theoretically that, under majority rule and
absent a lobby organized across states (a "transnational lobby"), the external agenda setter
will achieve its ￿rst-best policy. In line with the common perception (a¢ rmed by extensive
interviews with EU politicians, bureaucrats, lobbyists, and journalists in Brussels) that the
Commission is biased in favor of liberalization, this ￿rst-best policy will be free trade.
Of course, this theoretical result must be reconciled with a substantial empirical caveat:
namely, the fact that very high tari⁄ peaks remain in certain European sectors. By ex-
tending the model to incorporate the possibility of unanimity decision making, we show that
unanimity rule eliminates the agenda setter￿ s advantage. Although the conditions under
which unanimity rule is likely to be invoked (according to the "gentelmen￿ s agreement" af-
forded by the Luxemburg Compromise) are complex and outside of our model, this result
suggests a proximate explanation for the persistence of high tari⁄s in sectors that are politi-
cally important within individual countries (agriculture in France, for example). We further
demonstrate that the presence of a transnational lobby can substantially dampen the agenda
setter￿ s power, even with majority rule and even if the transnational lobby is identical to each
national lobby except with respect to its capability of lobbying multiple legislators. This
￿nding provides a theoretical reason to expect, ceteribus paribus, higher tari⁄s in sectors,
such as agriculture, chemicals, and automobiles that are organized transnationally; it also
explains why lobby consultancy ￿rms frequently advocate the formation of pan-European
coalitions.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 1.1 we brie￿ y pro￿le EU tari⁄policies following
implementation of the SEA. In section 2 we construct a base model, re￿ ective of EU insti-
tutions (but also of many other potential settings), and study outcomes under two rules:
majority and unanimity. In section 3, we add one transnational lobby. We derive general
conditions for approval or rejection of policies under two di⁄erent strategy spaces: one in
which contributions are conditional on the entire voting pro￿le and one in which contribu-
tions are conditional only on the vote of the recipient legislator. We then derive results for
a stylized multiple round application to trade policy. In section 4 we check the robustness
of our main results to an extension with multiple legislators, each with personal preferences.
Section 5 concludes. Complete proofs, as well as the formal model of section 4, are provided
in the appendix.
1.1 Motivation: Storming "Fortress Europe"
Prevailing political science theories in the 1970s and 1980s predicted that heightened trade
barriers would follow EU uni￿cation. One implication of the arguments of Taksacs (1981),
Gallarotti (1985), Cassig, McKeown and Ochs (1986), Magee and Young (1987), and Waller-
stein (1987) is that slow economic growth and high unemployment in the early 1990s Euro-
pean Union, combined with increased imports from outside the European Union, should have
boosted the demand for and supply of protection. Yet despite greater import competition
and the loss of six million jobs between 1991 and 1994, with average unemployment reaching
11 percent by 1994 (Hanson 1998, p. 59), "fortress Europe" did not succeed the creation of
3a single market on December 31, 1992.
To the contrary, European trade policy became distinctly more liberal. EU tari⁄s fell
sharply as a result of the Uruguay Round, along with quotas, subsidies, antidumping duties,
and surveillance measures. The average manufacturing tari⁄decreased by 38 percent, while
tari⁄s on many products were eliminated (World Trade Organization 1995, cited in Hanson
1998, p. 60 ). Hanson (1998) summarizes the post-uni￿cation trend: "recent EU trade policy
has been marked by two characteristics: the erection of very few new protectionist trade
barriers and a signi￿cant reduction in levels of protection for many industries...(I)ndustries
that demanded and received increased trade barriers during periods of economic hardship in
the past now face similar economic challenges but can no longer obtain the same levels of
trade protection" (pp. 60-61). This synthesis is con￿rmed by 1997 EU tari⁄ data compiled
by Di Nino (2002, 2004). As discussed in Console Battilana (2006), these data reveal
that EU tari⁄s are generally low and homogenous, and, when compared sector-by-sector,
generally lower than tari⁄s in the United States. If one views trade policy as determined
by a political-economic equilibrium of supply and demand, this outcome is surprising.
A partial resolution of this puzzle may be found in the con￿ uence of the spread of trade
agreements on the one hand and the apparent movement of the EU Commission toward
support of free trade on the other. In addition to policy changes implemented as a result
of multilateral negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the European Union signed twenty-six
bilateral trade agreements between 1990 and 1996 (The Financial Times, 16 February 1996,
cited in Hanson 1998, p. 60). As the body representative of the European Union in
these negotiations, the Commission has played a central role in liberalization of EU trade
policy. While protectionist notions may have held sway over the views of many Europeans
(and arguably members of the European Commission) during the 1970s and 1980s, available
evidence indicates that the Commission has since adopted distinctly liberal preferences with
respect to trade.3 Thus, one might argue that this simultaneous proliferation of trade
agreements and free trade ideology has driven more liberal EU trade policy.
This explanation is very incomplete, however. For one, the Commission does not vote
upon proposed changes to trade policy; the vote of the Council ultimately determines whether
or not proposals are implemented. As pointed out by Hanson (1998), among others, we
would expect representatives of member states to favor higher levels of protection for po-
litically important industries, especially during periods of rising unemployment and import
competition like the early 1990s. Second, very high tari⁄ peaks remain in certain sectors.
According to Di Nino￿ s (2002, 2004) data elaborated in Console Battilana (2006), the 49
3That the Commission favors free trade is supported by the author￿ s interviews of July 2005. P.G.
(DG Trade member) states, "The Commission has chosen the liberal model. We believe that liberalization of
markets is a necessary condition for growth. There is no closed economy that has experienced growth." M. B.
(ex cabinet member of Pascal Lamy) notes, "The Commission has historically had the role of managing the
liberalization inside and outside markets." An anonymous Gplus consultant points out that "The Commission
is not necessarily free trade. However, the DG Trade is, (this) is its mission. The DG Trade runs the EU
trade policy. They are economists." Further evidence that the Commission prefers freer trade is given by
Meunier (2000): "In the speci￿c case of international trade negotiations, however, the Commission can be
generally characterized as more liberal than the majority of the member states." Peter Mandelson (Trade
Commissioner) stated the following at the European Parliament hearing of October 4th, 2000: "As EU Trade
Commissioner I want to promote prosperity and social justice through open, rules-based trade. The bene￿ts
of free and fair trade should be extended to all, especially the poorest."
4highest EU tari⁄s in 1997 were all on agricultural products. In contrast to tari⁄s in most
other sectors, tari⁄s on these products were much higher than comparable US tari⁄s. Fur-
thermore, high tari⁄s remain in a number of non-agricultural sectors, including chemicals;
textiles; automobiles and parts; bicycles; publishing and printing; and glass and ceram-
ics. Thus, any explanation of post-uni￿cation EU trade policy must account not only for
a general movement toward liberalization (despite the putative presence of greater demand
for protection and the corresponding reluctance of those with direct voting authority, the
Council, to lower trade barriers), but also for continued high levels of protection in a few
sectors.
The remainder of the paper develops a game-theoretic framework capable of reproducing
the above facts. Our results highlight the extreme power of an exogenously chosen, external
agenda setter in an institutional setting re￿ ective of that in the EU; they also suggest that
this power can be eliminated or moderated by the application of unanimity (as opposed to
majority) rule or the presence of a lobby organized across multiple states.
2 A Model of EU Policy Making with National Lobbies
We study a stylized decision making institution, modeled after the European Union, with one
exogenously chosen, external agenda setter ("the Commission") that proposes modi￿cations
to a status quo policy; a voting body ("the Council") composed of three legislators, one per
nation; and one lobby in each nation. All actors are sophisticated (forward-looking).
The policy space at any given time consists of three "national projects," one in each
nation, each of which is either "on" or "o⁄."4 A national project could be any policy
outcome that generates a net bene￿t for the respective national lobby and net costs for
others. Here, we think of projects as tari⁄s. Imagine that each nation specializes in the
production of one good not produced in other nations. Producers from each nation are
organized in a respective national lobby and consume both the national good and the goods
produced in other nations. While distributional e⁄ects of course depend on (at least) relevant
supply and demand elasticities, in this setting it is likely that a tari⁄ on a particular good
would create a net bene￿t for the lobby representing producers of that good and a net loss
for other lobbies.
We assume that the Commission prefers that all projects be o⁄. In a trade policy setting,
this is equivalent to assuming that the agenda setter prefers free trade.5 The agenda setter￿ s
preferences do not align with those of national lobbies, since national projects generate net
bene￿ts for their respective lobbies and net costs for the agenda setter.
As in most extant formal models of lobbying (Grossman and Helpman 1996a; Helpman
and Persson 2001; Groseclose and Snyder 1996; Grossman and Helpman 1996b), lobbies may
4The assumption that national projects are binary variables is not crucial. The analysis that follows
extends to a continuous policy space, since in this case the agenda setter merely faces more choices but can
still reach its preferred policy. This intution is formalized in Bernheim and Console Battilana (2006), who
extend the set of choices to a generic policy space.
5This assumption is not crucial to the general result (derived below) that the agenda setter can achieve
its ￿rst-best policy outcome. Application of our model to the task of explaining the empirical puzzle set
forth above is not possible, however, without endowing the agenda setter with preferences. Thus, we opt
for those preferences that appear to be most realistic with respect to trade policy.
5attempt to in￿ uence policy outcomes by o⁄ering contributions to legislators. We further
assume that lobbies cannot form coalitions and that each lobby can contribute only to its
respective national legislator.6
Starting with a given status quo policy, the game proceeds through a ￿nite number of
rounds as follows: 1) At the beginning of each round, given a status quo, the agenda setter
proposes a policy vector that speci￿es which projects will be on and which will be o⁄ in the
next round. 2) Each lobby, given the status quo and the proposal, simultaneously and non-
cooperatively o⁄ers a contribution schedule to its legislator. Contributions are conditional
only on actions of the current round and on the current status quo.7 3) Legislators observe
only the contribution schedules o⁄ered to them and simultaneously and non-cooperatively
vote. The policy outcome at the end of each round becomes the status quo for the next
round. Only the policy outcome at the end of the last round is implemented.
Legislators maximize the contributions of their respective lobbies. Given that each
lobby can contribute only to their national legislator, this implies that each legislator will be
willing to vote for the outcome preferred by their nation￿ s lobby for an in￿nitesimally small
contribution. Hence, we employ the following simplifying assumption:
H1: Since each legislator is only in￿ uenced by their national lobby and would vote as
the lobby wishes for an in￿nitesimally small amount, we directly assume the legislator and
the lobby are the same agent. Formally, we assume that each lobby can vote.8
We proceed by ￿rst proving that, under the institutional setting outlined above and with
majority rule (as speci￿ed by Article 133), the agenda setter will achieve implementation of
its ￿rst-best policy regardless of the preferences of lobbies and regardless of the initial status
quo policy. In particular, we show that in a multiple round game, the agenda setter can
propose its optimal policy (free trade) in the ￿rst round and all legislators will vote for it,
even if all lobbies (and therefore legislators) prefer the status quo (protectionism).
This ￿nding regarding the strategic advantage of the agenda setter is stronger than results
from previous literature. While McKelvey (1976) and Scho￿eld (1978) have shown that
under sincere voting, myopic behavior and majority rule it is possible to ￿ wander anywhere￿
6 These appear to be realistic assumptions for many lobbies, for several reasons. In reality contributions
are not as a rule monetary, but instead take a variety of political forms. In order to be able to credibly
promise increased political support for a legislator, a lobby must not only be connected to a local (intra-
national) political network and have access to appropriate channels, but must also represent a political
faction important within the legislator￿ s nation. Here, lobbies representing di⁄erent sectors have interests
that directly con￿ ict. Coalitions would not be sustainable across national lobbies because there would exist
pro￿table deviations from possible agreements. In the next section we modify this assumption by adding a
lobby that represents a sector present across all nations.
7Some might argue that lobbies could build a reputation that allows them to o⁄er contributions conditional
on outcomes in multiple rounds. However, such contribution schedules would greatly magnify the model￿ s
complexity with little increase in realism. Moreover, lobbies would not be able to build a reputation
endogenously since this is not an in￿nitely repeated game. Furthermore, it is not clear that lobbies would
choose to o⁄er such contributions even if they could credibly commit to doing so. In any case, our intuition,
developed in Bernheim and Console Battilana (2006), is that the agenda setter would still be able to obtain
free trade even with more complex schedules.
8This hypothesis allows us to reduce notation and simplify the exposition. One could imagine that
legislators care also about the well-being of their constituents, but place greater weight on their own political
fortunes. In this case lobbies would still manage to have their legislator vote for their preferred outcome at
some given (low) cost.
6(for any points x and y, it is possible to ￿nd a sequence of proposals that takes voting
outcomes from one point to the other), Shepsle and Weingast (1984) demonstrated that,
if all legislators are sophisticated, there exists a ￿nite agenda with y as the ￿rst element
and x as the equilibrium outcome if and only if y does not cover x (Theorem 3).9 In our
model the agenda setter successfully proposes a policy that is in the covered set: even if
all voters prefer the protectionist status quo, the Commission can propose free trade in the
￿rst round, and it will be majority approved. Our result is an implication of the hypothesis
that the Commission adapts its proposals to the responses of other actors. We believe this
is realistic. As Garrett and Tsabelis (1999) point out, the Commission typically alters its
proposals several times to ensure adoption by the Council, and acts strategically in doing
so. Bernheim and Console Battilana (2006) show that the present paper￿ s result regarding
the power of the agenda setter holds also for a generic policy space.
We next demonstrate that under unanimity rule the status quo is the unique equilibrium
outcome. This result is consistent with intuition and may explain why agricultural tari⁄s
tend to be much higher than in other sectors. Under the Luxemburg Compromise, an
individual nation may veto a decision taken under majority rule if this decision a⁄ects "vital
interests" of that country. The legal basis for doing so can be found in Article 228, which
calls for unanimity rule "when the agreement covers a ￿eld for which unanimity is required
for the adoption of internal rules." Examples of such ￿elds include national security and
national budgets. While the conditions under which unanimity rule may be invoked are
vague and therefore outside of our formal model, we note that agriculture had very high
tari⁄s before uni￿cation. Thus, the threat posed by potential reductions in tari⁄s to the
"vital interests" of a country like France may be viewed as greater in the case of agriculture.
The Commission knows that, if it proposes to reduce certain agriculture tari⁄s, one nation
could demand the use of unanimity rule and reject the proposal. Hence we conclude that
high peaks in agriculture can be partially explained by the threat and occasional use of
unanimity rule.
2.1 Majority rule
Consider a stylized "union" with three nations, i = 1;2;3, a lobby in each nation and
one exogenously chosen, ￿xed external agenda setter.10 Productive factors in nation i is
specialized in sector i; and that sector is organized as lobby i. For each nation, there is a
project zi 2 f0;1g, with zi = 1 indicating that project i is on (e.g., protectionism in sector
i) and zi = 0 indicating that it is o⁄ (e.g., free trade in sector i). The policy space is given
by Z = f0;1g3, an element of which is denoted as z = (z1;z2;z3). For example, (0;1;0)
indicates that only project 2 is on. Notice that there are eight possible outcomes, jzj = 8.
Project i provides net bene￿ts of bi > 0 to lobby i at a cost of ci > 0 to each of the other
lobbies and a cost of di > 0 to the agenda setter. Assume that these costs and bene￿ts are
common knowledge and (without loss of generality) that d1 > d2 > d3
11. Bene￿ts and costs
9The uncovered set was ￿rst de￿ned by Miller: "a point y covers x if and only if the domination of x
contains the domination of y" (1980, p. 72).
10As noted in Riboni (2005), another example of ￿xed agenda setter can be found in the European Central
Bank.
11In the case in which d1 = d2 = d3 (if these costs are distributed according to some random distribution
7are additive over projects. (So, for example, when projects 1 and 2 are on, lobby 1￿ s payo⁄
is b1 ￿ c2, lobby 2￿ s payo⁄ is b2 ￿ c1, lobby 3￿ s payo⁄ is ￿c1 ￿ c2, and the agenda setter￿ s
payo⁄is ￿d1 ￿d2.) Assume that bi > cj +ck for j;k 6= i, so that every lobby prefers having
all three projects on to having all three projects o⁄. The optimal outcome for each lobby i
is zi = 1, zj = 0 for j 6= i. The agenda setter would like to have all projects o⁄. Formally,
we de￿ne Ii(z) =
￿
1 if project i is adopted











for the agenda setter.
We assume a ￿nite number of legislative rounds, T ￿ 3. The game proceeds as follows:
At the start of each round t 2 f1;Tg, the agenda setter proposes an alternative zt 2 Z to
the status quo zqt 2 Z. Under H1, each lobby observes zt and zqt, then votes for one or
the other (lobbies cannot abstain). Lobbies act simultaneously and non-cooperatively and
are unable to make credible commitments to each other. The policy receiving a majority of
votes becomes the status quo for the next round. The game is repeated from round t = 1
to t = T. The policy outcome of round T (de￿ned as zT+1), and only this outcome, is
implemented. We assume that all actors are sophisticated, in the sense that they forecast
and attempt to in￿ uence the outcome of the ￿nal round. At time t, neither lobbies nor
the agenda setter can commit to actions involving periods other than t. There are no
adjournment possibilities.
Equilibrium and Results
The equilibrium concept is pure strategy subgame perfect Nash.
Proposition 1 Agenda power under majority rule. For T ￿ 3 and any zqt 2 Z:
1) the unique equilibrium outcome of round T is b zT+1 = (0;0;0); and 2) there exists an
equilibrium in which the agenda setter proposes to turn o⁄ all projects in the ￿rst round and
every subsequent round (b zt = (0;0;0) for t = 1:::T) and every proposal is majority approved.
over a continuous domain, and if we draw randomly from this population of costs, then this is a zero
probability case), the agenda setter is indi⁄erent among projects. When solving backwards, we ￿nd multiple
equilibria. One possible equilibrium is the one in which the agenda setter breaks indi⁄erence by an inner
ranking, i.e. always turns o⁄ project 1 ￿rst, then project 2, and then project 3. In these cases, our result
regarding the ￿nal policy outcome holds. Another possible equilibrium is the one in which the agenda setter
randomizes by turning o⁄ one project in each round, where this project is selected with equal probability
from the remaining "on" projects. In this case, the agenda setter can drop only one project in the ￿nal
round. In the unrealistic case that d1 = d2 = d3, we choose to resolve indi⁄erence by arbitrarily assigning
a ranking (i.e., we assign a di⁄erent number to each project and then assume that the agenda setter always
prefers to drop the project with a lower cardinal ranking).
8The proof is given in Appendix A. We provide the intuition here. In the last round T,
for any status quo, the agenda setter can successfully propose turning o⁄at most one project
(otherwise at least two lobbies would vote against the proposal). Thus, the agenda setter
will propose turning o⁄the project most costly to itself from among those currently on. The
proposal will be majority approved since each lobby incurs a cost from projects that are on
in other sectors. Hence two lobbies will be better o⁄without the project of the other lobby.
Given that lobbies are sophisticated, in any round t < T, the choice between the status
quo zqt and the proposal zt is in essence a choice between the outcome that would arise at
round T if the proposal was approved in round t versus the outcome that would arise at
round T if the proposal was rejected in round t. We call the outcome at round T if a certain
z wins round t; the ￿ dynamic sophisticated equivalent￿ of z at t, or ￿(z;t). For example,
suppose zqT￿1 = (0;1;1) and zT￿1 = (0;0;0). Then ￿((0;1;1);T ￿1) = (0;0;1) because the
agenda setter will successfully propose turning project 2 o⁄ in round T given zqT = (0;1;1).
Likewise, ￿((0;0;0);T ￿ 1) = (0;0;0). Since lobby 1 and 2 both prefer policy (0;0;0) to
policy (0;0;1), they will both vote for proposal zT￿1 = (0;0;0), even if they both prefer zqT￿1
to zT￿1. With at least two rounds, the agenda setter can eliminate the two most costly
projects, projects 1 and 2. Now suppose that in the third to last round the status quo was
(1;1;1). If the agenda setter proposes turning o⁄ all projects then this proposal will be
majority approved, since ￿((0;0;0);T ￿ 2) = (0;0;0), ￿((1;1;1);T ￿ 2) = (0;0;1), and both
lobby 1 and lobby 2 prefer (0;0;0) to (0;0;1). Both lobbies know they will not have their
own projects implemented regardless of their vote and they know they would incur a cost
c3 if they voted against the proposal. When facing the choice between (0;0;0) and (1;1;1)
in round T ￿ 2, lobbies are in e⁄ect facing a choice between their dynamic sophisticated
equivalents ￿((0;0;0);T ￿2) = (0;0;0) and ￿((1;1;1);T ￿2) = (0;0;1). Thus, with three or
more rounds, the agenda setter can successfully propose turning o⁄ all projects in the ￿rst
round.
This result underscores the power of the agenda setter. Notice that the above proposition
holds even in the case where all projects are on in the ￿rst round, and therefore all lobbies
prefer the initial status quo to the ￿nal outcome. Even in this case, the agenda setter is
able to induce each lobby to vote against a preferred alternative in the ￿rst round. In e⁄ect
the agenda setter can create a prisoners￿dilemma for lobbies.
To our knowledge, this result does not exist in previous literature with sophisticated
voting. Shepsle and Weingast (1986) and Miller (1980) have shown that the agenda setter
could only reach outcomes in the uncovered set. However, (0;0;0) is covered by (1;1;1). In
our model the agenda setter can do more than reach its preferred outcome among those in
the uncovered set. The agenda setter can reach any outcome.
This result follows from the structure of the agenda. In Shepsle and Weingast (1986)
the amendment agenda is ￿xed (i.e., announced ahead of time) and not history contingent:
in round t = 1 the agenda setter announces all amendments (at) that will be proposed in
each round and the sequence (a1;a2;a3:::aT) is not contingent on outcomes. Regardless of the
status quo reached in round t, the given amendment at will be proposed. Instead, our agenda
setter does not pre-committ to a non-contingent agenda ahead of time. Our agenda setter
optimally chooses the proposal to pitch against the status quo of each round. Even if the
agenda is not announced ahead of time, lobbies have full information on the agenda setter￿ s
9preferences and therefore they can forecast the proposals that will be made at every possible
node of the Nash tree. Note that, without an institutional constraint to prevent renegging,
our agenda setter could not credibly announce a non-contingent agenda (a1;a2;a3:::aT) in
the ￿rst round, because this would not be optimal.
Bernheim and Console Battilana (2006) show that the agenda setter can still obtain its
￿rst-best policy with pre-committment, as long as proposals can be a function of the status
quo of each period t (e.g., (a1(zq1);a2(zq2);a3(zq3):::aT(zqT))). Alternatively, the agenda
setter can also obtain its ￿rst-best with a ￿ symmetric amendment￿(a1;a2;a3:::aT) (i.e., non-
contingent) agenda like the one described in Shepsle and Weingast (1986) if the agenda
setter can include adjournment provisions. Here, our agenda setter is not given the choice
to announce an agenda (history contingent or otherwise) ahead of time and is still able to
obtain its most preferred policy, even though all actors are sophisticated.
2.2 Unanimity rule
The setup is the same as in section 2.1, except that the voting rule is unanimity.
Proposition 2 Unanimity veto power. Under unanimity rule, the initial status quo
(zq1) is the unique outcome of every round (zq1 = zq2 = :::zqT = zT+1). An equilibrium
exists in which the agenda setter proposes the status quo in every round and it is accepted by
indi⁄erence.
A simple argument su¢ ces to prove the proposition: Suppose that the status quo of a
certain round was zqt and the ￿nal outcome zT+1. The agenda setter must weakly prefer
zT+1 to zqt, otherwise proposing zqt in every round would be a pro￿table deviation for the
agenda setter. Furthermore, every lobby i must weakly prefer zT+1 to zqt, otherwise lobby
i would deviate to veto the proposal of every round. But only zT+1 = zqt satis￿es these
conditions.
We are not addressing the question of when unanimity rule will be used. One could
imagine, however, that prior to each round of the game, all actors know that certain proposals
will result in the use of unanimity rule. If this is the case, then the agenda setter cannot
successfully advance such proposals. Voting may still take place according to majority rule,
but only if no such proposal is made. Therefore, the mere threat of unanimity rule may be
su¢ cient to ensure that the status quo remains in e⁄ect.
Thus, threatened or actual application of unanimity rule may explain why high barriers to
trade remain in certain sectors that are politically important within individual EU countries.
While we do not formally address the obvious question of when unanimity rule is likely to
be invoked under the Luxemburg Compromise, this result suggests a proximate explanation
for high trade barriers in agriculture and opens the deeper question for future research.
3 Lobbying transnationally
"Greatest weight was given to those actors who were prepared to establish ￿ European identity￿
through pan-European alliances." (Coen 1998, p. 78)
10The models presented in the previous section lend formal support to the idea that lib-
eralization in the European Union can be explained by the presence of an external agenda
setter and the application of majority rule. They also suggest that high agricultural tari⁄s
persist because of the potential application of unanimity rule a⁄orded by the Luxemburg
Compromise. Yet tari⁄ barriers remain in many non-agricultural sectors. In this section
we show how lobbies that are unable to invoke (or threaten) a unanimity rule may succeed
in retaining protection, despite the apparent free trade orientation of the EU Commission.
The previous section assumed that lobbies could contribute only to their respective na-
tional legislators and therefore that lobbies could be treated as voters (H1). Helpman and
Persson (2001) employ the same assumption. Yet as more policies have devolved to the
European Union, some lobbies have attempted to form transnational coalitions that allow
political contributions to be made across national borders. Coen (1997a,1997b, 1998) shows
empirically that political activity shifted away from national and toward transnational chan-
nels between 1984 and 1994. In addition, lobby consultancy ￿rms in Brussels often advise
their clients to build alliances where possible. For example, in the Presentation of HGlatz
at the Europaisches Forum Alpbach 2005, quoted in Greenwood 2005, the advice is: "Build
alliances whenever possible". Likewise, Burson-Marsteller (2005), a lobby consultancy ￿rm,
suggests: "Search for allies, and build coalitions whenever possible. Ad hoc and temporarily
issue speci￿c coalitions can be just as in￿ uential as long standing partnerships". Coen (1998)
notes that "the creation of the single market and the strengthening of European institutions
has harmonized the ￿rms￿political activity across borders" (p. 75). This section provides
an explanation for high tari⁄s in sectors represented by transnational lobbies.
We begin by adding a fourth sector, present in each country and represented in all
countries by a single ￿ transnational lobby.￿ Note that the de￿ning characteristics of the
transnational lobby are two-fold: 1) this lobby represents producers of a good produced in
every country and thus may contribute to legislators from every country; and 2) this lobby
acts as a single coalition. When such a transnational lobby is present the agenda setter
cannot fully exploit the self-interest of national lobbies (those that can contribute only to
their national legislator), since the transnational sector can contribute directly to a majority
of legislators.
With a fourth lobby present, legislators and lobbies can no longer be treated as identical
actors; H1 no longer applies.12 Lobbies will condition their contributions on legislators￿
actions. We derive results under two alternative assumptions:
H2: Contributions are conditional on the entire voting pro￿le; and
H3: Contributions are conditional only on the vote of the legislator receiving the contri-
bution.13
Our results a¢ rm the strategic advantage of transnational lobbying. Under H2, the
12Hereafter, when using pronouns to refer to actors, we use "he" in the case of a legislator; "she" in the
case of a lobby; and "it" in the case of the agenda setter.
13We investigate H3 because we believe that in reality contribution schedules under H2 might not be
possible. For one, it might be too complicated to design such a contribution schedule. Even if designing
such a schedule were possible, legislators might not understand what was being o⁄ered, especially given that
contributions are non-monetary. Furthermore, a legislator might prefer contributions that are dependent
only on his actions, and might not want to consider contributions conditional on multiple events not under
his in￿ uence.
11transnational lobby can prevent implementation of any policy that is not bene￿cial to her
and can do so at no cost by utilizing the pivot strategy described below. Furthermore, any
policy bene￿cial to the transnational lobby will be majority approved. In equilibrium, the
transnational lobby creates a prisoner￿ s dilemma by o⁄ering a contribution schedule that
ensures that no legislator will be pivotal; hence no legislator acting alone can a⁄ect the
outcome. Dal Bo (2000, 2006) reaches a similar result in a setting with a single lobby and
three voters with preferences over outcomes.
Under H3, for any proposal we order the national lobbies according to the change in their
payo⁄ (relative to the status quo) that would occur if this proposal were implemented. We
￿nd that no proposal that negatively impacts the payo⁄to the transnational lobby can pass,
unless the bene￿t of this proposal to the median national lobby is greater than the loss to
the transnational lobby. On the other hand, the agenda setter can successfully propose any
policy that bene￿ts the transnational lobby, so long as any loss to the median national lobby
is not greater than the bene￿t to the transnational lobby.
Section 3.5 presents a simple version of the model in a trade setting. We pose the
following question: If all sectors di⁄er only with respect to goods produced and location(s)
of production, does a transnational lobby have an advantage? Under both H2 and H3 we
￿nd that the unique ￿nal outcome of a multiple round game is free trade in all national
sectors and a status quo tari⁄ in the transnational sector.
3.1 The model
We ￿rst derive results for a single round game and then show how these results extend to
games of multiple rounds. The outcome of our single round game is a policy vector specifying
which of four projects are on and which are o⁄. Countries are labeled ￿ 1,￿￿ 2￿ , and ￿ 3;￿we label
the transnational sector ￿ 4.￿ A policy is a quadruple z = (z1;z2;z3;z4), where zi 2 f0;1g,
with zi = 1 indicating that project i is on and zi = 0 indicating that project i is o⁄. We













4) and a generic element of this vector as z0
i. The proposed policy and the
status quo are in the policy space Z = f0;1g
4.
The actors are three legislators, (l1;l2;l3); four lobbies, i = 1;2;3, and 4; and one external
agenda setter. In this section, we adopt more general payo⁄ functions for lobbies than in
Section 2.1. Given the status quo zq and a policy proposal z0, de￿ne gi(z0;zq) as the change
in lobby i￿ s payo⁄ that would result if policy were changed from zq to z0 (for example,
gi(zq;zq) = 0).14 Thus, if gi(z0;zq) > 0, lobby i prefers the proposal to the status quo;
if gi(z0;zq) < 0, lobby i prefers the status quo to the proposal. For each status quo and
proposal we rank all national lobbies according to their gi and refer to the median lobby
as ￿ m:￿ Legislators care only about maximizing received contributions (an extension to the
case where legislators have preferences over policies is provided in Section 5). Each project
i that is on imposes a cost of di on the agenda setter.
After the agenda setter proposes a policy alternative z0 2 Z to the status quo, lobbies o⁄er
contributions to legislators. We assume that contributions must be non-negative. Lobbies
1;2; and 3 can o⁄er contributions only to their respective legislator, while lobby 4 can o⁄er
14The payo⁄s in Section 2.1 are a special case.
12contributions to every legislator. Legislator i is o⁄ered contributions of xi by his national
lobby and contributions of x4i by lobby 4. Each legislator li casts vote vi 2 f0;1g on the
proposed policy, where vi = 1 signi￿es a "yes" vote and vi = 0 indicates a "no" vote. A
voting pro￿le is a vector v = (v1;v2;v3). Note that there are eight possible voting pro￿les:
v 2 V = f(0;0;0);(0;0;1);(0;1;0);(1;0;0);(1;1;0);(1;0;1);(0;1;1);(1;1;1)g.
Under H2, each lobby can condition her contributions on the entire voting pro￿le v. We
denote the contribution schedule of national lobby i (for i = 1;2;3) to legislator i as xi :
li￿ V ! R; a speci￿c contribution to li conditional on voting pro￿le v is denoted xv
i. Lobby
4 o⁄ers to each legislator i a contribution schedule x4i, conditional on the voting pro￿le.





43). Note that x4 : fl1;l2;l3g ￿ V ! R. Each legislator observes
the contributions o⁄ered to him only. For each possible voting pro￿le, the legislator will
receive an o⁄er from his national lobby and an o⁄er from the transnational lobby. Hence the
strategy space for legislators is ￿i : R16 ! f0;1g.
Under H3, each lobby can condition her contributions to legislator i only on that legis-
lator￿ s vote, vi. We denote the contribution schedule of national lobby i (for i = 1;2;3) to
legislator i as xi : li ￿ f0;1g ! R; a speci￿c contribution conditional on vote vi is denoted
as x
vi
i . Lobby 4 o⁄ers to each legislator i a contribution schedule x4i = (x1
4i;x0
4i), condi-







x4 : fl1;l2;l3g ￿ f0;1g ! R. Each legislator observes the contributions o⁄ered to him only
and then votes. Each legislator￿ s strategy space is ￿i : R4 ! f0;1g.
The objectives of each actor are as follows: The agenda setter minimizes costs; that is,
max









































4j (under H3) for lobby 4:














Under both assumptions, the one-round game proceeds via the following substages:
Substage 1): Given a status quo zq 2 Z; the agenda setter makes a proposal z0 2 Z:
Substage 2): Lobbies observe the proposal z0 then simultaneously and non-cooperatively
o⁄er contribution schedules to the legislators. Lobbies i = 1;2;3 o⁄er contribution schedules
xi to their corresponding legislator li. Lobby 4 o⁄ers contribution schedules x4i to each
legislator li; for i = 1;2;3:
Substage 3): Each legislator observes the contributions o⁄ered to him only. The legisla-
tors simultaneously vote either for zq or z0. Legislators cannot abstain. Decisions are by




133.2 Equilibrium when lobbies can condition payments on all votes
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is pure strategy subgame perfect Nash.
De￿nition 1 A contribution schedule is said to be consequential i⁄ non pivotal legislators
are o⁄ered zero contributions, both on and o⁄ the equilibrium path.15
Results
We solve the game backwards. Once the agenda setter has made a proposal, lobbies and
legislators face a binary outcome. In substage 1, the agenda setter will propose the policy
that maximizes its welfare, subject to approval of a majority of legislators, who in turn base
their decisions on the o⁄ers of lobbies.
The fact that a ￿ pivot strategy￿ (described below) is available to the transnational lobby
ensures that the following result holds:
Lemma 1 Pivot strategy Under H2, for any zq, there exists an equilibrium in which the
agenda setter proposes its most preferred policy from among those preferred to the status quo
by the transnational lobby (b z0 = argmaxz WA(z) s.t. g4(z;zq) ￿ 0), all lobbies o⁄er zero
contributions for any voting pro￿le (b xv
i = b xv
4i = 0 8i and 8v) and all legislators vote for the
proposal (b v = (1;1;1)). Furthermore, any equilibrium in which only consequential strategies
are used has the properties that the outcome is b z = b z0 and no positive contributions are ever
paid on the equilibrium path (b xb v
i = b xb v
4i = 0 8i ).
A proof is presented in Appendix A. The intuition is as follows: In the ￿nal two substages,
lobbies and legislators face a binary alternative between the status quo and a proposal. For
any proposal, consider the case in which all lobbies o⁄er zero contributions for any voting
pro￿le and all legislators vote for the alternative preferred by the transnational lobby. No one
has an incentive to deviate: In Substage 3, legislators receive zero contributions regardless of
their vote, and hence have nothing to gain from deviating. In Substage 2, the transnational
lobby obtains her preferred outcome for free and national lobbies cannot a⁄ect the outcome
since their corresponding legislator is not pivotal.
There exist other equilibria. However, if only consequential strategies are played in equi-
librium, then, given a proposal, there is no equilibrium in which the transnational lobby￿ s
preferred alternative is rejected or the transnational lobby pays positive contributions. Sup-
pose there was such a candidate equilibrium. Then the transnational lobby could deviate by
playing the following pivot strategy: In Substage 2, for any voting pro￿le, the transnational
lobby o⁄ers to each legislator voting against the transnational lobby￿ s preferred alternative
slightly more than the legislator￿ s national lobby is o⁄ering in the candidate equilibrium. In
Substage 3, every legislator￿ s dominant strategy will then be to vote for the transnational
lobby￿ s preferred alternative. No legislator will be pivotal if the transnational lobby devi-
ates using this strategy. Hence, in the deviation, contributions will only have to be made
15Requiring contributions to be consequential is equivalent to using an equilibrium re￿nement. We are not
restricting the set of strategies, but rather the set of equilibria. In other words, if a player could pro￿tably
deviate from a candidate equilibrium by playing a non-consequential strategy, then this would not in fact be
an equilibrium.
14to non-pivotal legislators. But because the transnational lobby is deviating from an equi-
librium in which lobbies play only consequential strategies, she will only have to contribute
an arbitrarily small amount. Since the contributions required to sustain this deviation are
arbitrarily small and therefore less than the bene￿t to the transnational lobby from sus-
taining the deviation, this deviation is pro￿table for the transnational lobby. Thus, the
candidate equilibrium does not exist. The pivot strategy (although it will never be played
in equilibrium) enables the transnational lobby to exploit majority rule by creating a pris-
oner￿ s dilemma.16 In section 4 we show how this result holds even if legislators have personal
preferences.
3.3 Equilibrium when lobbies can condition payments only on the
legislator￿ s own vote
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is pure strategy subgame perfect Nash.
De￿nition 2 Contribution schedules are said to be preference consistent i⁄ no lobby
o⁄ers a positive amount for a vote against her preferred outcome (on or o⁄ the equilibrium
path).
De￿nition 3 If there exist multiple equilibria, we say that an equilibrium is collusion proof
i⁄ two or more legislators could not pro￿tably deviate to a di⁄erent equilibrium.
Results
We solve the game backwards and establish the following:
Lemma 2 Median Lobby Result. Under H3, there exists an equilibrium in which the
agenda setter proposes its most preferred policy from among those such that the sum of net
bene￿ts to the transnational lobby and the median lobby is positive (b z0 = argminz ￿
P
i Ii(z)di
s.t. g4(z;zq)+gm(z;zq) ￿ 0). Furthermore, all collusion proof equilibria have outcome b z = b z0
and have equilibrium paths that share the following properties: If the proposal creates a loss
for the transnational lobby (g4(b z0;zq) < 0), then two national lobbies each pay contributions
equal to the amount of this loss (b x
b vi
i = b x
b vj
j = ￿g4(b z0;zq) and b x
b vi
k = 0 for some i 6= j 6= k) and
lobby 4 pays no contributions (b x
b vi
4i = 0 8i): If g4(b z0;zq) ￿ 0 and contributions are preference
consistent, then no contributions are paid on the equilibrium path (b x
b vi
4i = b x
b vi
i = 0 8i):
A proof is provided in Appendix A; here we present the intuition. In the ￿nal two
substages, lobbies and legislators again face a binary alternative between the status quo and
the proposal. Assume, without loss of generality, that the transnational lobby favors the
proposal. There exists an equilibrium of this continuation game in which all legislators vote
for the proposal and no contributions are o⁄ered for any vote. No legislator has an incentive
to deviate, since contributions are the same regardless of his vote. Since no legislator is
16Note that even if we do not eliminate weakly dominated strategies, in equilibrium no weakly dominated
strategies are played.
15pivotal, no national lobby has an incentive to deviate. The transnational lobby obtains her
preferred policy at no cost.
However, there might also exists an equilibrium in which a majority of legislators vote
for the status quo. For this to be the case, it must be that only two legislators vote for the
status quo and the other votes against: If instead the status quo passed unanimously, then no
legislator would receive positive contributions (since any lobby o⁄ering positive contributions
could pro￿tably deviate by reducing her contribution). But then the transnational lobby
could pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering two legislators an arbitrarily small amount for a "yes"
vote and zero for a "no" vote. Hence, the status quo can be approved only by two pivotal
legislators. Given this, the transnational lobby only needs to recruit one additional vote
to change the outcome. The maximum that each pivotal legislator i can receive in this
equilibrium is max[￿gi;0]. With gm < 0 the transnational lobby would have to pay at
most ￿gm + " to recruit one pivotal legislator. Hence, if g4 ￿ 0 and g4 > ￿gm, the status
quo cannot be the equilibrium outcome. On the other hand, if g4 ￿ 0 and g4 ￿ ￿gm, then
there exists an equilibrium in which the status quo receives the votes of two legislators and
positive contributions are paid.
Whenever there is such an equilibrium, we argue that the equilibrium in which all three
legislators vote for the proposal is unrealistic: two legislators could jointly deviate to the
equilibrium with the status quo as the outcome and both would be better o⁄.
Given these continuation equilibria, the agenda setter will solve the constrained maxi-
mization problem described in Lemma 2. Note that restricting the set of strategies to those
that are preference consistent merely guarantees that lobbies with gi ￿ 0 will not arbitrarily
increase the contributions that lobby 4 must pay to ensure that the proposal passes. This
restriction a⁄ects only equilibrium contributions and not the equilibrium outcome.
3.4 Results for T>1
In this subsection we brie￿ y explain how the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 can be used
to derive equilibria for games of multiple rounds.
Consider a game with a ￿nite number of rounds T > 1: Denote the contributions paid
by each lobby i on the continuation equilibrium path from round t given that policy z is
majority approved as xi(z;t):17 As in section 2.1, given a status quo zqt and a proposal zt; the
dynamic sophisticated equivalents are ￿(zqt;t) and ￿(zt;t). Since on the continuation path
positive contributions might be paid, we further de￿ne the dynamic sophisticated equivalent








We can now state the following:
Corollary 1 Any T > 1 round game can be solved backwards using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
(under H2 and H3 respectively) through the use of dynamic sophisticated equivalent outcomes
and payo⁄s.
17Note that this term does not include contributions paid in round t.
16We give an example. Consider a game with T = 3. At t = 3, given any status quo zq3,
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 give the equilibrium outcome and the contributions paid by each
lobby at t = 3. These contributions are in turn the contributions paid on the continuation
equilibrium path from t = 2, xi(zq3;2).18 Going back to round 2, for any status quo
zq2 and any proposal z2, the equilibrium of round 3 determines the continuation outcomes
￿(zq2;2) and ￿(z2;2). Therefore, in round t = 2, we can look at the remaining game as a
one round game. The dynamic sophisticated equivalent payo⁄s would be ￿gi(z2;zq2;2) =
gi(￿(z2;2)) ￿ gi (￿(zq2;2)) ￿ xi(z2;2) + xi(zq2;2). Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 now give us the
￿nal outcome for any zq2 and the contributions paid on the continuation equilibrium path
from t = 1. The equilibrium of round 2 determines ￿(zq1;1) and ￿(z1;1) for any zq1 and
z1. Going back to round 1, we can again apply the Lemmas by substituting ￿gi(z1;zq1) =
gi(￿(z1;1)) ￿ gi (￿(zq1;1)) ￿ xi(z1;2) + xi(zq1;1) as payo⁄s, which will give the outcome of
the whole game. In essence, a multiple round game can be reduced to a single round game
through the use of dynamic sophisticated equivalents and the preceding lemmas.
By applying the corollary to any T ￿ 1 round game under H2, we ￿nd that no proposal
that leaves the transnational lobby worse o⁄ than the initial status quo can ever pass. In
particular, whenever the projects of other lobbies create a cost to lobby i and whenever no









4 ), the ￿nal outcome will be zT+1 = (0;0;0;z
q1
4 ). This follows from the
fact that, regardless of the number of rounds, ￿g4(zt;zqt;t) < 0 for any policy that turns o⁄
project 4 in the last round. In addition, all other projects can be eliminated in the ￿rst
round for any T ￿ 1 since ￿g4(zt;zqt;t) > 0 for such proposals. Note that in section 2.1,
three rounds were needed to guarantee that all national projects would be turned o⁄. One
round in su¢ cient under H2 and transnational lobbying.
Under H3, the outcome of a multiple round game will depend on the relative dynamic
sophisticated equivalent payo⁄s of the transnational and the median lobbies. However, with
T ￿ 3, as long as the projects associated with each lobby create a cost to other lobbies, the
results of section 2.1 guarantee that all national projects can be eliminated (for a formal
proof of this generalization see Bernheim and Console Battilana 2006). Thus, if z
q1
4 = 1, the
￿nal equilibrium outcome will be either (0;0;0;0) or (0;0;0;z
q1
4 ), depending on ￿g4 R ￿gm.
The next section applies the above results to a speci￿c trade example.
3.5 The transnational advantage: An application to trade policy
In this subsection we present an application to trade policy. Starting from a protectionist
status quo, we pose the question: If the transnational lobby is identical to all other lobbies
except with respect to being organized transnationally, does this transnational lobby have a
strategic advantage in determining trade policy?
We look at a small open economy ("the union"), comprised of three nations i = 1;2;3.
The exogenous vector of world prices is p￿. We normalize the total population of the union
to 1. Each nation i has a portion of total population, ￿i, who own the factors used to
produce good i (which is produced only in nation i) and who reside in nation i. A fourth
good, 4, is produced in all nations. The owners of factors used to produce good 4 constitute
18Notice that zq3 is by de￿nition the policy that is majority approved at round 2 and thus will equal either
zq2 or z2.
17a portion ￿4 of the union￿ s total population and are spread across all three nations. We call
sectors 1;2; and 3 "national" and sector 4 "transnational." Because we want to study the
advantage of the transnational sector holding all other economic variables equal, we assume
￿1 = ￿2 = ￿3 = ￿4 = ￿ ￿ 1
4.
Factors used to produce one good are used to produce that good only. Individuals owning
a factor used to produce a particular good cannot own factors used to produce other goods.
Each individual is homogenous in their compensated demand for all goods. The producers
of each sector are organized in lobby i. We assume quasi-linear, separable compensated
demand functions and quasi-linear supply functions within the union. Therefore, quantity
demanded and supplied for good i depends on the price of good i only, and there are no
income e⁄ects. Figure 1 illustrates demand and supply for one good.
Figure 1
The economy faces a status quo vector of tari⁄s, zq1; with an identical positive tari⁄ ￿
in all sectors (zq1 = (￿;￿;￿;￿)). Relative to free trade, a positive tari⁄ has the following
e⁄ects: it reduces total consumer surplus (area A+B+G+D); it increases producer surplus
(area A); it generates government revenue (area G); and it reduces the total welfare of the
economy by creating a distortion (area B+D). We assume that the net revenue from tari⁄s
(area G) is equally distributed among all individuals, hence total consumer loss is net of
tari⁄ revenue (area A + B + D; we denote this sum as C).
We assume that the agenda setter seeks to maximize the sum of the utility of all indi-
viduals. A tari⁄ creates a net bene￿t A ￿ ￿C to its lobby while generating a cost of ￿C
for all other lobbies and a cost of B + D for the agenda setter. To guarantee uniqueness of
equilibria, we assume that the agenda setter resolves any indi⁄erence among national tari⁄s
by ￿rst attempting to lower tari⁄ 1, then tari⁄ 2, and then tari⁄ 3.
The game proceeds as follows through a ￿nite number of rounds, T ￿ 3:








i 2 f0;￿g. (As before, the choice is binary: protection or free
trade).
182. Lobbies simultaneously and non-cooperatively o⁄er contributions (under H2 or H3;
we derive results separately for each case below). Lobbies 1;2; and 3 can o⁄er contributions
only to their nation￿ s legislator; lobby 4 can contribute to all legislators.
3. Legislators observe only the contributions o⁄ered to them, then vote simultaneously
and non-cooperatively. The winning policy becomes the status quo for the new round, zqt+1.
4. The game is repeated from t = 1 to t = T ￿ 3. The policy receiving a majority of
votes in round T is implemented.
Equilibrium and results
The equilibrium concept is pure strategy subgame perfect Nash. Contributions are either
contingent on the entire voting pro￿le (H2) or only on the vote of the legislator receiving the
contribution (H3). Under H2, we look for equilibria in which only consequential strategies
are played. Under H3, we look only for collusion proof equilibria in which lobbies￿strategies
are preference consistent.
We solve backwards, and ￿nd the following:
Proposition 3 For any T ￿ 3, under both H2 and H3, if ￿ > A
4C, the ￿nal outcome is free
trade in all sectors, (0;0;0;0); if ￿ < A
4C; the ￿nal outcome is free trade in all national sectors
and the status quo tari⁄ in the transnational sector, (0;0;0;￿); if ￿ = A
4C the equilibrium
outcome could be either (0;0;0;0) or (0;0;0;￿).
The proof is in Appendix B. The intuition is as follows: The agenda setter seeks to
eliminate as many tari⁄s as possible. The cost to each lobby from shifting to free trade
in her sector is ￿A; the gain from shifting to free trade in any sector is ￿C. Thus, the
maximum gain for each lobby is 4￿C and the maximum loss is ￿A. If ￿ > A
4C, all lobbies
prefer (0;0;0;0) to the status quo (￿;￿;￿;￿). If ￿ < A
4C, then eliminating a lobby￿ s tari⁄
will always harm that lobby no matter how many other sectors￿tari⁄s are eliminated.
Under H2, no policy disliked by the transnational lobby can ever be implemented (as
discussed above). Hence, if ￿ < A
4C; no policy proposing the elimination of sector 4￿ s tari⁄
will ever pass. Therefore, the Commission￿ s second best objective is to eliminate the tari⁄s
of all other sectors. We have seen in section 3.4 that this can be achieved with any T ￿ 1.
Under H3, national tari⁄s can still be eliminated if there are at least three rounds.
However, at any round t; a proposal that would lead to the elimination of the transnational
tari⁄ at time T will pass only if the sum of the dynamic sophisticated equivalent payo⁄s
to the transnational lobby and the median national lobby is greater than zero (i.e., the
ultimate loss to the transnational lobby is smaller than the ultimate gain to the median
national lobby). This never happens if ￿ < A
4C; in this case the transnational sector￿ s tari⁄
can never be eliminated.
3.5.1 Political Economic Implications
This section has demonstrated that, within an institutional setting similar to that of the EU,
a transnational lobby will be able to retain her sector￿ s tari⁄by exploiting the majority rule
setting. If we allowed the Commission more than a binary choice between protection and
free trade, then the Commission would be able to lower the tari⁄of the transnational sector
to the point at which the cost to the transnational lobby is equal to the bene￿t that the
19transnational lobby derives from the elimination of other tari⁄s. However, the transnational
tari⁄ still could not be eliminated.
These theoretical results may explain why high tari⁄ peaks tend to exist in sectors or-
ganized transnationally and also why lobby consultancy ￿rms recommend building pan-
European coalitions. Coen (1997) notes that EU institutions advantage those interest groups
capable of establishing an "European identity" through alliances with rival ￿rms. We show
this transnational advantage is not simply a matter of greater resources or economies of
organizational scale, but rather derives from the ability of a transnational lobby to exploit
the EU institutional setting.
4 Extension
4.1 N>3 nations and legislators with outcome dependent prefer-
ences
In this section we extend the model to a setting with an odd number N ￿ 3 of nations
and we allow legislators to have preferences that depend on policy outcomes in addition to
contributions. We again study a single round game. Our results will apply to games of
multiple rounds through the use of dynamic sophisticated equivalents.
Even with additional nations and legislators with outcome dependent preferences, ver-
sions of the pivot strategy and median lobby lemmas presented above still hold. In particular,
we ￿nd that
Proposition 4 If there are an odd number N ￿ 3 of legislators with personal preferences
dependent on the outcome, N corresponding national lobbies, and one transnational lobby,
then, given an alternative between any z and any zq
1. Under H2, in all equilibria in which consequential strategies are played, the transna-
tional lobby obtains her preferred policy at no cost, even if all legislators and all national
lobbies dislike the outcome.
2. Under H3, in equilibrium the transnational lobby obtains her preferred outcome if the
bene￿t of this policy to the transnational lobby is greater than the sum of: 1) the
maximum loss that can be incurred by the minimum number of legislators necessary to
constitute a majority and 2) the loss incurred by the median national lobby.
We present both the formal set up and the proof in Appendix C. Here we provide a brief
intuition for each part of the proposition.
Part 1. When contributions can be conditioned on the entire voting pro￿le, the transna-
tional lobby will obtain her preferred outcome at no cost. This result holds because the
transnational lobby can design contributions so that no legislator will be pivotal in equi-
librium, and hence no legislator can a⁄ect the outcome. Therefore a legislator￿ s personal
outcome dependent preferences do not a⁄ect his voting decision.
20By playing such a pivot strategy, the transnational lobby can eliminate any candidate
equilibrium which does not have her preferred policy as its outcome. The pivot strategy is
simply to o⁄er a supermajority (at least a majority plus one) of legislators an arbitrarily small
amount more than what they would receive in the candidate equilibrium. All legislators
o⁄ered this schedule will vote for the policy preferred by the transnational lobby and no
legislator will be pivotal. In equilibria in which consequential strategies are played, no
national lobby o⁄ers positive contributions to a non-pivotal legislator. Therefore, if there was
a candidate equilibrium in which the transnational lobby had to pay positive contributions
or did not obtain her preferred outcome, the transnational lobby could deviate by playing
this pivot strategy and would have to pay only an arbitrarily small amount to each legislator
within the supermajority. The transnational lobby could do so regardless of how small her
gain or how high the loss to other national lobbies. Thus, every equilibrium has the property
that the transnational lobby obtains her preferred outcome at no cost.
Part 2. When contributions can be conditioned only on the vote of the recipient legislator,
we show there exists an equilibrium in which a supermajority of legislators votes for the policy
preferred by the transnational lobby and no contributions are o⁄ered. Yet, because actors
cannot coordinate, multiple equilibria exist. The condition presented in the proposition is
a su¢ cient condition: it ensures that there does not exist an equilibrium in which the policy
preferred by the transnational lobby is not the outcome. Suppose not, i.e., suppose the
aforementioned condition holds and that there is a candidate equilibrium with an outcome
not preferred by the transnational lobby. If in such an equilibrium no legislator was pivotal,
the transnational lobby could o⁄er to compensate a majority of legislators for their loss
of personal utility and to contribute an additional arbitrarily small amount. Since in the
candidate equilibrium no legislator is receiving positive contributions (no one is pivotal),
a majority of legislators would deviate and the transnational lobby would be better o⁄.
Suppose instead that an exact majority of legislators was voting against the transnational
lobby in the candidate equilibrium. In this case every legislator within this majority would be
pivotal. The transnational lobby could recruit the remaining legislators at the price of their
personal outcome dependent payo⁄plus an arbitrarily small amount and in addition recruit
the least expensive legislator from within the majority. This remaining legislator would
have to be compensated both for his outcome dependent payo⁄and for the contributions he
might be receiving from his national lobby. Regardless of the original candidate equilibrium,
the latter amount can be at most jgmj, the absolute value of the payo⁄ to the median lobby
of the outcome not preferred by the transnational lobby. By assumption, the transnational
lobby would be willing to o⁄er su¢ cient contributions to recruit a majority. Hence, no
equilibrium with an outcome not preferred by the transnational lobby can exist.19
5 Conclusion
Procedure a⁄ects outcomes. A major achievement of game theoretic work on political eco-
nomics has been to highlight the ways in which rules play an independent role in shaping
19Note that the proposition states a su¢ cient condition, not a necessary condition: the outcome not pre-
ferred by the transnational lobby could also be defeated through a joint e⁄ort of the transnational lobby and
national lobbies with aligned preferences. However, multiple equilibria can arise as a result of coordination
problems across lobbies.
21policy. The present paper contributes to this literature. Our results underscore the power of
an external agenda setter in a multiple round majority rule setting similar to that of many
institutions, including the EU trade policy apparatus. Previous theoretical work has found
that, when actors are sophisticated, such an agenda setter can reach any outcome in the
uncovered set. Our ￿nding is much stronger. We show that, if the agenda setter is not
limited to proposing non-contingent (or "symmetric amendment") agenda but can instead
modify its proposals in response to other actors, the agenda setter can in fact reach any
outcome immediately.
Applied to EU trade policy for the period following the creation of an internal market,
our model suggests institutional reasons for the observed general decline in external trade
barriers, despite earlier predictions of increasing protectionism. Reality, however, suggests
that the power of a free-trade biased EU Commission is far from absolute￿ very high tari⁄s
persist in certain sectors. This paper also adds to existing theory on this count, by providing
game theoretic proof that unanimity rule or transnational lobbying may each limit the agenda
setter￿ s ability to reach its most preferred outcome.
With respect to transnational lobbying, our result is again stronger than those of most
literature. When contributions are conditioned on the entire voting pro￿le, we show that
no policy disliked by the transnational lobby can ever pass and that the transnational lobby
acheives this outcome at no cost. If contributions are conditioned on the vote of each
recipient legislator, we ￿nd that the transnational lobby can prevent passage of any proposal
by outbidding the median national lobby. The transnational lobby￿ s advantage does not
derive simply from its ability to recruit the cheapest minimum winning coalition. Instead,
this advantage stems from the transnational lobby￿ s unique ability to play a pivot strategy and
thereby induce an equilibrium in which no legislator is pivotal. Groseclose and Snyder (1996)
show that recruiting a supermajority may be cheaper than recruiting a smaller majority. We
show that recruiting a supermajority is costless when a pivot strategy can be employed.
In other work, we extend the theory developed here. Console Battilana and Shepsle
(2006) apply the theoretical framework of the present paper to supreme court nominations.
Bernheim and Console Battilana (2006) incorporate a generic policy space and show that
unlimited agenda power persists under pre-commitment (to a contingent agenda) or if there
exist adjournment possibilities. Console Battilana (2006) explores the case in which lobbies
appeal directly to the agenda setter via informational lobbying. In all of these papers,
versions of the results outlined above continue to hold.
Hanson (1998) p. 56 argues that "European integration has played a considerable role in
the liberalization of European external trade policy by changing the institutional context in
which trade policy is made, creating a systematic bias toward liberalization over increased
protection." Taken as a whole, our model explains game theoretically why this has been the
case and also why liberalization has not spread to all EU sectors.
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24Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1, Agenda Power
Proof. We solve the game backwards from round T. For each of the eight possible con￿gu-
rations of the status quo zqT, the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes
are given by the table below:
Table 1









In each case, "possibilities" are all proposals that would pass (including trivially the
status quo) and "outcome" is the agenda-setter￿ s preferred choice among these. Knowing
these are the possible outcomes in the last round (i.e. the possible dynamic sophisticated
equivalents for any round t < T), we take one step back to round T ￿ 1. For each possible
status quo zqT￿1 and proposal zT￿1, we know that the vote is between the outcome that
arises in round T if policy zqT￿1 wins, ￿( zqT￿1;T ￿ 1); versus the outcome that arises in
round T if proposal zT￿1 wins, ￿(zqT￿1;T ￿ 1). For example, suppose the status quo of
round T ￿ 1 is (0;1;0). From the last round game, we know that, if this wins in the
second to last round and becomes the status quo for the last round, the outcome will be
￿((0;1;0);T ￿1) = (0;0;0). Therefore, when voting in T ￿1 lobbies will vote for (0;1;0) i⁄
they prefer (0;0;0) to the dynamic sophisticated equivalent that would emerge if they voted
for the agenda setter￿ s proposal, zT￿1. Notice that this is not the same as asking whether
they prefer (0;0;0) to zT￿1.
From round T, we know that there are only four possible outcomes: (0;0;0), (0;0;1),
(0;1;0), and (0;1;1). In round T ￿ 1, each zqT￿1 and each zT￿1 is associated with one
of these outcomes, ￿(z;T ￿ 1) 2 f(0;0;0), (0;0;1), (0;1;0);(0;1;1)g for z 2 fzT￿1;zqT￿1g
Consequently, the two round game is just like a one round game where the possible choices
are the dynamic sophisticated equivalents. For this "reduced" one round game, we have
Table 2.
Table 2





20Without loss of generality, we are showing the case in which c1 > c2 > c3. This assumption only a⁄ects
the possibilities column and not the outcome column.
25Combining table 2 with table 1, we can make up the required table for the two round
game.
Table 3









For example, consider the status quo zqT￿1 = (1;0;1). We know from table 1 that, if
this becomes the status quo for round T, the outcome will be ￿((1;0;1);T ￿ 1) = (0;0;1).
However, from Table 2 we see that for this dynamic sophisticated equivalent the outcome is
(0;0;0), which therefore appears in the "outcome" column of table 3. From table 1, we see
that this outcome is obtained if (0;0;0), (0;0;1), (0;1;0), or (1;0;0) becomes the status quo
for round T. Consequently, the agenda setter can propose any of these alternatives in round
T ￿ 1.
Having solved backwards for the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
round T and T ￿1, we go back one round, and look at the game from round T ￿2. Given a
status quo zqT￿2 and a policy proposal zT￿2, the lobbies compare the dynamic sophisticated
equivalents: the ￿nal outcome that arises in round T if the status quo or the policy proposal
win round T ￿ 2. From round T ￿ 1, we know that there are only two possible outcomes:
(0;0;0) and (0;0;1). In round T ￿ 2, each zqT￿2and zT￿2 is associated with one of these
outcomes: ￿(z;T ￿ 1) 2 f(0;0;0);(0;0;1)g for z 2 fzT￿2; zqT￿2g: Consequently, the three
round game is just like a one round game where the possible choices are (0;0;0) and (0;0;1).
For this "reduced" one round game, we can make up a table like table 1.
Table 4
￿(z;T ￿ 2) Possibilities Outcome
(0;0;0) (0;0;0) (0;0;0)
(0;0;1) (0;0;0);(0;0;1) (0;0;0)
Combining table 4 with table 3, we can make up the required table for the three round
game.
Table 5
Status quo zqT￿2 Outcome Proposal(s) zT￿2
(0;0;0) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(0;0;1) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(0;1;0) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(1;0;0) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(0;1;1) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(1;0;1) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(1;1;0) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
(1;1;1) (0;0;0) Anything but (1;1;1)
26For example, consider the status quo zqT￿2 = (1;0;1). We know from table 3 that, if
this becomes the status quo for round T ￿1, the outcome will be ￿((1;0;1);T ￿2) = (0;0;0).
From table 4, we see that, in the reduced form one round game, (0;0;0) leads to the outcome
(0;0;0), which therefore appears in the "outcome" column of table 5. From table 3, we see
that this outcome is obtained if anything other than (1;1;1) becomes the status quo for round
T ￿1. Consequently, the agenda setter can propose any of these alternatives in round T ￿2.
If T = 3, zq1 = (1;1;1) and the agenda setter proposes (0;0;0) in the ￿rst round, two lobbies
are strictly better voting for it, even though they prefer (1;1;1) to (0;0;0). Moreover, with
T > 3, we know the outcome will be (0;0;0) regardless of the status quo inherited by the
third to last round. Therefore, all play before the third-to-last round is irrelevant. If (0;0;0)
is proposed in the ￿rst round, there always exists an equilibrium in which it is accepted in
the ￿rst round by indi⁄erence.
Proof of Pivot Strategy Lemma 1
Proof. We solve backwards. In substage two and three, lobbies and legislators are facing
a binary alternative between a given z and a given zq. We ￿rst solve these substages for
a generic z, and then apply constrained maximization for substage one. Without loss of
generality, we prove the results of substage two and three for g4 ￿ 0 (the case with g4 ￿ 0 is
symmetric).
Existence. Equilibrium voting pro￿le (1;1;1) is sustained by a contribution schedule
in which each lobby o⁄ers zero contributions for every voting pro￿le (b xv
i = b xv
4i = 0 8i and
8v). No legislator has an incentive to deviate, since he always receives zero contributions for
vi 2 f0;1g. No lobby has an incentive to deviate: lobby 4 is receiving its preferred outcome
at no cost. Lobby i = 1;2;3 can only in￿ uence the vote of one legislator, since each legislator
only observes changes in contributions o⁄ered to him. But no legislator is pivotal, hence no
lobby has an incentive to deviate.
If contributions are consequential, there is no equilibrium in which a status quo di⁄erent
than the proposal is approved. Suppose there was one. This candidate equilibrium would
also be characterized by a contribution schedule e xi for all i. Lobby 4 could deviate by o⁄ering
x
1;v2;v3
41 = e x
0;v2;v3
1 + " 8 v2;v3, x
v1;1;v3
42 = e x
v1;0;v3
2 + " 8 v1;v3; x
v1;v2;1
43 = e x
v1;v2;0
3 + " 8 v1;v2 and
xv
4i = 0 8 v s.t vi = 0. We will refer to this strategy as the pivot strategy. Voting 1 is a
dominant strategy for each legislator, hence there is a deviation to (1;1;1). If the initial
con￿guration with the status quo as an outcome (
3 P
vi=1
e vi < 2) had been an equilibrium with
consequential strategies, then e x
0;1;1
1 = e x
1;0;1
2 = e x
1;1;0
3 = 0 (take for example e x
0;1;1
1 . In voting
pro￿le v = (0;1;1) legislator li is not pivotal, therefore he is o⁄ered no contributions for that
voting pro￿le in a consequential strategy pro￿le) . Therefore, the new equilibrium payo⁄ of
lobby 4 would be g4 ￿ 3" > 0 for " arbitrarily small. Since in any equilibrium with outcome
zq lobby 4￿ s net payo⁄ is less or equal to zero, lobby 4 would be strictly better o⁄ and the
original pro￿le with the status quo as an outcome could not have been an equilibrium.





4i = y > 0. If contributions are consequential, this can not happen
in e v = (1;1;1), since no legislator is pivotal. Therefore, it has to be that the candidate
27equilibrium had two pivotal legislators,
3 P
i=1
e vi = 2. But then, lobby 4 could play the pivot
strategy with " =
y
4, and all legislators would vote 1. Lobby 4 would be contributing 3" < y;
since e x
0;1;1
1 = e x
1;0;1
2 = e x
1;1;0
3 = 0 in any equilibrium with consequential contributions.
In substage one, knowing the continuation game, the agenda setter proposes its preferred
policy under the constraint that it is approved.
Proof of Median Lobby Lemma 2
We prove the Lemma by establishing successive claims that refer to substage two (con-
tributions) and substage three (votes) of the game. In equilibrium the agenda setter will
propose the policy that maximizes its payo⁄and is majority approved. Hence, we ￿rst solve
the subgame given a proposal z and a status quo zq, and determine which policies could
be majority approved. Without loss of generality, assume g4 ￿ 0. Relabel the lobbies (and
the legislators) so that g1 ￿ g2 ￿ g3. We denote this lobby 2 as the "median lobby". Let "
denote an arbitrary small positive real number.
Claim 2 On the equilibrium path of play
1. No lobby makes a positive payment if her preferred outcome is not implemented.
2. Whenever gi ￿ 0 (gi < 0), lobby i does not contribute more than gi (￿gi) for a vote in
favor of z (zq) and zero for outcome zq(z). Lobby 4 never pays more than g4 in total
for outcome z and zero for outcome zq.
Proof. Suppose there were a lobby that makes a positive payment when her less preferred
outcome is chosen. But then, the lobby could deviate to contribute zero in all cases, and
her loss would be reduced regardless of which policy is chosen. Suppose a lobby were paying
more than her net bene￿t from the preferred policy relative to the other outcome and the
preferred policy were implemented. But then the lobby could deviate to contribute zero in
all cases. If the outcome does not change, the lobby is better o⁄. If the outcome changes, the
lobby loses the net bene￿t, but saves more than the net bene￿t in contributions, therefore
the lobby is better o⁄.
Claim 3 On the equilibrium path of play a non-pivotal legislator receives a compensation of
0:
Proof. Suppose not. Any lobby i contributing to the non-pivotal legislator could reduce
the contribution. Regardless of whether the legislator changes his vote, the outcome does
not change: he is not pivotal and other legislators observe only the contributions o⁄ered to
them, hence their vote is not a⁄ected. Lobby i is better o⁄.
Claim 4 There does not exist an equilibrium voting pro￿le where all legislators vote for 0:
Proof. Suppose v = (0;0;0) was an equilibrium voting pro￿le given some pro￿le of contri-
bution o⁄ers. By Claim 3, for all legislators, x0
i = x0
4i = 0. But then, lobby 4 could o⁄er
x4 = (";";0;0;0;0). Both l1 and l2 would deviate, the outcome would be z and lobby 4
would be better o⁄. Hence v = (0;0;0) cannot be an equilibrium.
28Claim 5 There exists an equilibrium where the proposal is majority approved. Furthermore,
in any such equilibrium,
(a) if g2 < 0, all three legislators vote for the proposal and no payment is made on the
equilibrium path and
(b) if g2 ￿ 0, if preference consistent strategies are used, no payment is made on the
equilibrium path and either 2 or 3 legislators vote for the proposal





4i = 0 be the equilibrium contribution schedule for all i. No legislator i
has an incentive to deviate from v = (1;1;1), since his payo⁄s are always zero. No lobby has
an incentive to deviate: lobby 4 is getting her preferred policy at no cost. No lobby i has an
incentive to deviate because li is non pivotal, and hence lobby i cannot a⁄ect the outcome.
We now prove that there is no other contribution schedule sustaining this equilibrium. By
Claim 3, x1
i = x1
4i = 0 for all i. If there was any positive contribution for a zero vote, at
least one legislator would deviate and the voting pro￿le would not have been an equilibrium.
Therefore, x0
i = x0
4i = 0 for all i.
(a) We prove that neither (1;1;0), or (0;1;1) or (1;0;1) can be an equilibrium if g2 < 0.
Assume by contradiction there was a ￿ candidate￿equilibrium in which two legislators,
denoted as lp and ln; were pivotal and voted 1, e vp=n = 1 and denote the non pivotal legislator
as lk (so e vk = 0). By claim 2, the non pivotal legislator would be receiving no payments
to vote for 0, e x0
k = e x0
4k. In the ￿ candidate￿equilibrium, either e x1
4p > 0 or e x1
4n > 0. If not,
either lobby p or lobby n (or both) would prefer outcome 0 and o⁄er positive contributions
to its legislator (either x0
p > 0, or x0
n > 0) who would deviate to vote 0. But then lobby 4
could have saved these contributions by o⁄ering the following schedule: no contributions to
the legislator receiving a positive amount, x1
4k = ";x0
4k = 0 to the non-pivotal legislator and
unchanged contributions to the remaining legislator. The winning policy would still be the
proposal, and lobby 4 would have saved on contributions.





4i = 0 8i. No legislator has an incentive to deviate,
since contributions are always zero. No lobby has an incentive to deviate: lobby 2;3;4 are
receiving their preferred policy at no cost and lobby 1 can in￿ uence only l1; who cannot
a⁄ect the outcome. Furthermore, in all equilibria with two pivotal legislators voting for 1,
no contributions are paid for any choice if lobbies are playing preference consistent strategies.
Denote the non pivotal legislator as lk and pivotal legislators as lp and ln. By Claim 3, no
contributions are o⁄ered to lk to vote 0, so x0
ik = x0
4k = 0. He also receives no contributions
to vote 1, otherwise he would deviate, so x1
ik = x1
4k = 0. Total payments from lobby
4 to lp and ln are zero, x0
4p + x0
4n = 0. Suppose not. Then lobby 4 could deviate to
o⁄er x4 = (0;";";0;0;0);" arbitrarily small. Since lobbies are playing preference consistent
strategies and g2 ￿ 0, l2 and l3 are o⁄ered no contributions to vote 0, x0
2 = x0
3 = 0; hence they
would vote for 1 and lobby 4 would be better o⁄. Therefore, x1
4p = x1
4n = 0. Consequently,
x0
4p = x0
4n = 0, otherwise the legislators would deviate. We also show that lobby p and




n = 0. If they
o⁄ered positive payments for vote 1, b x1
p > 0 or b x1











n = 0 respectively and the legislator would not change his vote (since
29x0
4p = x0
4n = 0) . If they o⁄ered positive contributions for a 0 vote,b x0
p > 0 or b x0
n > 0, given
x1
4p = x1
4n = 0 and x1
p = x1
n = 0, the legislator would deviate. Hence, no contributions are
ever o⁄ered in equilibrium.
Claim 6 If g2 ￿ 0, there is no equilibrium where the status quo is chosen
Proof. Suppose the status quo was chosen. By claim 4, the equilibrium voting pro￿le
cannot be (0;0;0). Suppose it was v = (1;0;0). Then, by claim 2, x0
2 = x0
3 = 0. But then
lobby 4 would have pro￿table deviation: x4 = (0;";";0;0;0), two legislators deviate and the
proposal wins. Suppose then the voting pro￿le was either v = (0;1;0) or (0;0;1). Denote
the legislator voting no as ln 2 fl2;l3g and the other legislator ly 2 fl2;l3g. By claim 2,
x0
n = 0 and x0
4n = 0. By claim 3 x1
y = 0 and x1
4y = 0. In addition, x0
y = 0, otherwise the
legislator would deviate. But then, lobby 4 could deviate by o⁄ering x4 = (0;";";0;0;0), l2
and l3 would both vote for the proposal and lobby 4 would be better o⁄.
Claim 7 If g2 < 0, there exists an equilibrium in which the status quo is chosen i⁄ ￿g2 ￿ g4
Proof. We ￿rst show existence. We claim that, if g2 < 0 and ￿g2 ￿ g4, voting pro￿le (0;0;1)
and contribution schedules x4 = (g4;g4;0;0;0;0); x1 = (0;g4);x2 = (0;g4);x3 = (0;0) are an
equilibrium. No legislator has an incentive to deviate: l3 never receives positive contributions,
l1 and l2 always receive g4. No lobby has an incentive to deviate. Lobby 3 cannot a⁄ect
the outcome. If lobby 2 or lobby 1 lowers her contributions for a no vote, l2 or l1 deviates.
Lobby 2 or lobby 1 have nothing to gain by raising contributions to more than g4 for a no
vote: if they did, the outcome would not be a⁄ected and they would be worse o⁄. Hence,
lobby 1 and 2 have no pro￿table deviation. Lobby 4 has no pro￿table deviation: to a⁄ect
the outcome she would have to o⁄er either x1
41 > g4 or x1
42 > g4. But, if lobby 4 succeeded
switching the vote of either of them, lobby 4 would have a negative payo⁄ and be worse o⁄.
Hence this is not a pro￿table deviation.
Now suppose g2 < 0 and ￿g2 < g4. Suppose there was an equilibrium in which the status
quo was chosen. By Claim 3, there exists a non pivotal legislator lk such that vk = 1. By
Claim 3, x1
k = 0. But then, x0
k = 0, otherwise legislator lk would deviate. Now consider the
pivotal legislators. If l3 is one of them, and g3 ￿ 0, then x0
3 = 0 by claim 2. But then, lobby
4 can deviate as follows: x4k = x43 = (";0) and zero to the third legislators. Both lk and l3
vote for the proposal and lobby 4 would be better o⁄. Therefore, it could not have been an
equilibrium. Consider instead the case in which either a) l3 is pivotal and g3 < 0 or b) l2 is
pivotal. By claim 2, a) x0
3 ￿ ￿g3 b) x0
2 ￿ ￿g2. But then lobby 4 would have a deviation:
o⁄er a) x43 = (￿g3 + ";0); x4k = (";0) b) x42 = (￿g3 + ";0); x4k = (";0) and o⁄er (0;0)
to the remaining legislator. Both legislator lk and a)l3 b) l2 would vote for the proposal and
lobby 4 would be better o⁄ since ￿g3 < ￿g2 < g4.





4i = 0 8i and v = (0;0;1), x4 = (g4;g4;0;0;0;0); x1 = (0;g4);x2 = (0;g4);x3 = (0;0).
The ￿rst equilibrium is not collusion proof, since legislators l1 and l2 receive a positive
payment of g4 in the second equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 3
We prove the proposition by establishing several claims: ￿rst we show that the Proposi-
tion is true for ￿ > A
4C. Then we show that, whenever ￿ < A
4C, the following holds: under H2,
￿4 can not be eliminated (claim 9) and (0;0;0;￿) is the unique outcome of round T (claim
10); under H3, ￿4 can not be eliminated (claim 11) and (0;0;0;￿) is the unique outcome of
round T (claim 12). The case for ￿ = A
4C follows.
In order to facilitate the proofs, we sometimes use Nash game threes. When we use the
terminology ￿ node￿we are referring to this three: in the ￿rst round there is one node, in
the second round there are two di⁄erent nodes and so on. Under H2 we always assume
that consequential strategies are played and under H3 we always assume that lobbies are
preference consistent and that the legislators play a collusion proof equilibrium vote strategy.
In order to apply Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we use dynamic sophisticated equivalent payo⁄s.
Claim 8 If ￿ > A
4C (and ￿ ￿ 1
4), then the unique outcome is (0;0;0;0) under both H2 and
H3:
Proof. All lobbies prefer (0;0;0;0) to (￿;￿;￿;￿) because each lobby has a bene￿t of 4￿C ￿
A > 0 (given ￿ > A
4C), therefore, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, there exists an equilibrium
in which the agenda setter proposes (0;0;0;0) in every round and it is approved in round
t = 1 (since ￿gi(zt;zqt;t) ￿ 0 8t and 8i = 1;2;3;4). Furthermore, there can be no other
outcome because (0;0;0;0) is the agenda setter ￿rst best and it would deviate to proposing
zT = (0;0;0;0) in round T if zT+1 6= (0;0;0;0).
Claim 9 If ￿ < A
4C, the tari⁄ of the transnational sector can never be eliminated under
H2.
Proof. Suppose it could be eliminated in the last round, T. This would imply that
￿g4(zT;zqT;T) < 0 and the proposal was accepted, a contradiction of Lemma 1: only propos-
als with ￿g4(zT;zqT;T) ￿ 0 can be approved. Therefore, the tari⁄of the transnational sector
cannot be eliminated in the last round. Now assume it cannot be eliminated in round t, and
show it cannot be eliminated in round t ￿ 1. In round t ￿ 1, any proposal to eliminate the
tari⁄ in sector 4 would bring to a dynamic sophisticated equivalent with free trade in sector
4. If the proposal was rejected, then the status quo for round t would include the tari⁄ of
the transnational sector, and it could not be eliminated by assumption. Therefore, in t ￿ 1,
￿g4(zt￿1;zqt￿1;t￿1) < 0 for any proposal to eliminate the tari⁄ of the transnational sector,
and hence the proposal is rejected by Lemma 1. Therefore, the tari⁄ of the transnational
sector can never be eliminated.
Claim 10 If ￿ < A
4C; (0;0;0;￿) is the unique last round outcome under H2.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. Given lobby 4￿ s tari⁄ is in place (because of
claim 9), (0;0;0;￿) is proposed in the last round T, and it is majority approved with zero
contributions (see Lemma 1), regardless of the status quo. There are no deviations for
lobbies and legislators: if the status quo of round T ￿ 1 has n > 0 positive tari⁄s in some
31national sector, the transnational lobby has a gain of nC > 0 from their elimination, and
the proposal is accepted by Lemma 1. If the status quo of round T ￿ 1 is (0;0;0;￿), the
proposal is accepted by indi⁄erence. By claim 9, the status quo cannot be (0;0;0;0). The
agenda setter has no deviations: it can never eliminate the tari⁄in the transnational sector.
If it chooses to propose a policy with positive tari⁄ in the transnational sector and n > 0
national sectors and the proposal is accepted, it reduces its bene￿t by n(B +D). Hence, the
agenda setter has no deviation.
We prove that there can be no other outcome. Suppose (0;0;0;0) was an equilibrium
outcome in the last round. This contradicts claim 9. Suppose there was a last round
equilibrium with n > 0 positive tari⁄s in national sectors. But then the agenda setter would
have a positive deviation of n(B + D) in proposing (0;0;0;￿) in the last round.
Note that, even if there is a single round, the agenda setter can also propose (0;0;0;￿)
and it is approved. Even if there are T > 1 rounds, the agenda setter can propose (0;0;0;￿)
in the ￿rst round, it wins and it is not changed in subsequent rounds.
All claims that follow use the results derived in Lemma 2 and Claim 7. To apply them,
at each node of the Nash game three we re-order the national lobbies so that ￿g1(zt;zqt;t) ￿
￿g2=med(zt;zqt;t) ￿ ￿g3(zt;zqt;t) and de￿ne ￿gmed(zt;zqt;t) to be the net payo⁄of the median
lobby.
Claim 11 If ￿ < A
4C, the tari⁄ of sector 4 cannot be eliminated under H3.
Proof. Suppose it could be eliminated in the last round T. This would imply that there was
a proposed tari⁄ vector with free trade in sector four that would be majority approved to
an alternative tari⁄ vector with tari⁄ in sector four, henceforth ￿ the alternative￿ . If the two
tari⁄vectors di⁄ered only by the tari⁄in sector 4, in the proposed tari⁄vector lobby 4 would
be worse o⁄ by ￿g4(zT;zqT;T) = ￿A + ￿C and the median lobby would be better o⁄ by
￿gmed(zT;zqT;T) = ￿C: But, since ￿ < A
4C, ￿￿g4(zT;zqT;T) > ￿gmed(zT;zqT;T), therefore
the proposal could not be approved by Lemma 2. Now suppose instead the proposal elimi-
nates the tari⁄ in sector 4 and one other tari⁄ in respect with the alternative with positive
tari⁄in sector four. But then, ￿g4(zT;zqT;T) = ￿A+2￿C and ￿gmed(zT;zqT;T) = 2￿C. But
then, since ￿ < A
4C, ￿￿g4(zT;zqT;T) > ￿gmed(zT;zqT;T), therefore the proposal could not be
approved by Lemma 2. Now suppose that instead the proposal eliminates tari⁄four and two
or more national tari⁄s in respect to the alternative. But then, both the transnational lobby
and the median lobby would incur in a loss, ￿g4(zT;zqT;T) + ￿gmed(zT;zqT;T) < 0; and the
proposal could not have been approved by Lemma 2. Therefore, in round T, no proposal
that eliminates the tari⁄in sector four can be approved. Suppose that no proposal that elim-
inates ￿4 can be approved in round t. Then, no proposal that eliminates ￿4 in round t￿1 can
be approved: if zqt￿1 wins, by assumption, the dynamic sophisticated equivalent at time T
keeps the tari⁄of sector 4. Instead, if the proposal passes, the dynamic sophisticated equiv-
alent has free trade in sector 4. Hence, ￿g4(zt￿1;zqt￿1;t ￿ 1) + ￿gmed(zt￿1;zqt￿1;t ￿ 1) < 0.
Therefore the proposal is rejected in round t ￿ 1 by Lemma 2. By induction, the tari⁄ of
sector 4 can never be eliminated.
Claim 12 If ￿ < A
4C, policy vector (0;0;0;￿) is the unique outcome under H3,.
32Proof. By the previous claim, tari⁄four cannot be eliminated. We claim the strategy shown
in Figure 2 leads to outcome (0;0;0;￿) in equilibrium:
Figure 2
Proof. We solve the game backwards referring to Figure 2. In round T, the (node speci￿c)
median lobby and the transnational lobby both always prefer the proposal, since it gives
a bene￿t of 2￿C to both (see node 4,5,6 in Figure 3). Therefore, it is majority approved
by Lemma 2 and no contributions are paid. In node 2 of Figure 3, round T ￿ 1, given the
continuation game, the alternative is between approving and reaching ￿((0;0;￿;￿);T ￿1) =
(0;0;0;￿) or rejecting the proposal and reaching ￿((0;￿;￿;￿);T ￿1) = (0;0;￿;￿). Both the
transnational lobby an the (node speci￿c) median lobby have a positive bene￿t of 2￿C from
the proposal, therefore proposal (0;0;￿;￿) is accepted by Lemma 2. In node 3 of Figure
3, round T ￿ 1, the proposed policy leads to outcome ￿((0;￿;￿;￿);T ￿ 1) = (0;0;￿;￿),
while rejecting the proposal leads to outcome ￿((￿;￿;￿;￿);T ￿ 1) = (0;￿;￿;￿): Both the
transnational lobby and the median lobby (recall that the median lobby is node speci￿c,
hence the median lobby is one whose project is not eliminated) have a positive bene￿t of
2￿C, therefore the proposal is majority approved. In round T ￿ 2, given the continuation
game, approving the proposal leads to outcome ￿((0;￿;￿;￿);T ￿ 2) = (0;0;0;￿), while
rejecting it leads to outcome ￿((￿;￿;￿;￿);T ￿ 2) = (0;0;￿;￿): Both the transnational and
the (node speci￿c) median lobby have a positive bene￿t of 2￿C, therefore the proposal is
majority approved in round T ￿2. From round 1 to round T ￿3, the agenda setter proposes
the status quo (￿;￿;￿;￿) and this policy will be the status quo for round T ￿ 2. (It is
irrelevant if it is accepted or rejected along the path).
No other outcome can be an equilibrium. Given claim 11, eliminating all national tari⁄s
is the second best for the agenda setter, so that the agenda setter￿ s loss in equilibrium is
￿B ￿D. Suppose there was an equilibrium with n 2 f1;2;3g national tari⁄s on in the ￿nal
round. But then, the agenda setter￿ s payo⁄ would be ￿(1 + n)B ￿ (1 + n)D < ￿B ￿ D,
therefore the agenda setter would deviate to the above strategy.
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The set up
We look at an economy that has to decide between two alternative policies, the status
quo, zq, and a given proposal, z. The actors are an odd number N > 4 of legislators, labelled
(l1;l2;::::::;lN), N national lobbies, each denoted as i = 1;2;:::;N, and a transnational lobby,
denoted as lobby N + 1. We assume that each lobby has a personal utility dependent on
the ￿nal outcome, denoted as gi(:). We normalize the bene￿ts from the status quo to zero,
and denote as gi(z) the bene￿ts from the proposal. Likewise, lobby N + 1 derives a utility
gN+1(z) from the proposal, and zero utility from the status quo, gN+1(zq) = 0.
Legislator￿ s i utility is given by the sum of contributions he receives, plus Li(:); his
personal bene￿t from the policy outcome. We normalize bene￿ts from the status quo to
zero, and denote Li(z) to be the bene￿t from the proposal. Note that gi(z) > 0 or Li(z) > 0
implies that the lobby and the legislator respectively prefer the proposal to the status quo,
while gi(z) < 0 or Li(z) < 0 denotes a preference for the status quo.
The strategies of each player are as follows: Each lobby o⁄ers contributions: lobbies
i 2 f1;Ng o⁄er contributions to the corresponding legislator li only, the transnational lobby
N+1 is free to o⁄er contributions to any legislator. Each legislator li casts a vote vi = f0;1g,
vi = 0 if he votes against the proposal (for the status quo), and vi = 1 if he votes in favor
of the proposal. We de￿ne v = (v1;v2;:::;vN) to be a voting pro￿le. There are 2N possible
pro￿les, and we call the set of possible voting pro￿les V . The decision rule is majority rule:
let M = N+1
2 . If more or equal to M legislators cast vote for the same outcome, that outcome
is implemented.
Under H2, contributions are conditional on the entire voting pro￿le. Hence, the strategy
space for contributions of lobby i to legislator li will be xi : li ￿ V ￿! R, while lobby N + 1
can contribute to each legislators, hence xN+1 : V ￿ fl1;l2;::::::;lNg ￿! R. Each legislator
observes his personal utility and the contributions o⁄ered to him only. The strategy space
for each legislator is ￿i : R ￿ 2R2N ! f0;1g.
Under H3, contributions are conditional only on the vote of each legislator. The strategy
space of lobby i 2 f1;Ng is xi : li ￿ f0;1g ￿! R; and lobby N + 1 can contribute to any
legislator, xN+1 : fl1;l2;::::::;lNg ￿ f0;1g ￿! R. Each legislator observes the contributions
o⁄ered to him only and his personal utility and casts a vote, ￿i : R ￿ R4 ￿! f0;1g. We
write the contributions as xi = fcontributions o⁄ered to li for vi = 1; contributions o⁄ered
for vi = 0g:
The game proceeds as follows: given a status quo zq and an alternative z, observed by
all players
1) Lobbies simultaneously and non cooperatively o⁄er contribution schedules to the leg-
islators. Lobbies i 2 f1;Ng can o⁄er contribution schedules fxig only to the corresponding
legislator li, i.e. lobby 2 can contribute only to legislator l2. Lobby N + 1 is free to o⁄er
contribution schedules fxN+1g to any legislator li
2) Each legislator observes the contributions o⁄ered to him only. The legislators simul-
taneously vote. A majority carries the day: if
N P
i=1





We look at pure subgame Nash equilibria in which lobbies play consequential strategies.
Proposition 5 Under H2, all equilibria in which consequential strategies are played posses
the property that the policy preferred by the transnational lobby is the unique outcome (b z = ￿
z if gN+1(z;zq) ￿ 0
zq if gN+1(z;zq) < 0 ) and the transnational lobby pays zero contributions on the equilib-
rium path (xb v
N+1;i = 0 8i)
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume gN+1 > 0. Existence. The following strategies
constitute an equilibrium: each legislators casts vi = 1 for any possible voting pro￿le and
contribution schedule, each national lobby o⁄ers xv
i = 0 8 v and lobby N + 1 o⁄ers the
following contribution schedule to every legislator:
xN+1;i =
￿
max[0;￿Li(z)]8 v in which vi=1 and exactly M ￿ 1 other legislators vote 1
0 all other v 2 V
No lobby has an incentive to deviate. The transnational lobby obtains her preferred
outcome for free, since in equilibrium more than M legislators vote 1. The national lobbies
can only in￿ uence their own legislator, and their own legislator is not pivotal. If lobby
i 2 f1;Ng o⁄ers positive contributions to their legislator for a voting pro￿le in which all
other legislators vote 1, the outcome is una⁄ected and lobby i is worse o⁄. If lobby i o⁄ers
positive contributions for a di⁄erent voting pro￿le, this does not a⁄ect the equilibrium,
hence is not a pro￿table deviation. Each legislator li is either indi⁄erent between vi = 1 and
vi = 0, or weakly prefers vi = 1. If legislator li is pivotal (when exactly M￿1 other legislators
vote 1) and votes vi = 1, the outcome is z and his total utility including contributions is
Li(z) ￿ Li(z) = 0 if Li(z) ￿ 0, and is Li(z) > 0 otherwise. If he is pivotal and votes vi = 0,
the outcome is zq and his utility is 0. Whenever he is pivotal, he is either indi⁄erent (when
Li(z) ￿ 0) or prefers voting vi = 1. If legislator li is not pivotal, there are two possibilities:
either weakly more than M legislators vote 1, and his total utility is Li(z) regardless from
what he votes, or weakly more than M legislators vote 0, and his utility is 0 regardless
from what he votes. Therefore, no legislator has an incentive to deviate and no legislator is
choosing a weakly dominated strategy.
There is no equilibrium with outcome zq 6= z (hence gN+1(z;zq) > 0) and no equilibrium
in which lobby N + 1 pays positive contributions. Suppose there was one, denote it as
the "candidate" equilibrium. We show lobby N + 1 can deviate to a "pivot" strategy that
guarantees outcome z at a cost (M+1)", with " > 0 arbitrarily small. There is always " small
enough such that this deviation is pro￿table: if the outcome of the candidate equilibrium
was zq , " <
gN+1
M+1 ; if lobby N + 1 was paying total positive contributions y > 0 in the
candidate equilibrium, " <
y
M+1.
In order to de￿ne the "pivot" strategy, we introduce new notation. We are interested
in the o⁄ers to legislator li, taking as given the action of all other legislators. Therefore
we de￿ne the partial voting pro￿le v￿i, composed by the actions of all legislators other
than li, and denote as 0;v￿i and 1;v￿i the voting pro￿les in legislators other than li behave
35according to v￿1 and legislator li voted vi = 0 and vi = 1 respectively. We are assuming the
"candidate" equilibrium exists, and denote the equilibrium contributions of local lobbies as
e xi. In particular, e x
0;v￿i
i denotes the contributions schedule o⁄ered from lobby i to legislator
li whenever he votes vi = 0 and the remaining lobbies vote according to v￿i. (note that there
are 299 possible 0;v￿i 2 V ). Lobby N + 1 can deviate to o⁄er the following contribution
schedule to M + 1 legislators:
xN+1;i =
8
> > > <
> > > :
max[0;￿Li(z)] + e x
0;v￿i
i + "8 v￿i in which
P
j6=i
vj = M ￿ 1 and vi = 1
e x
0;v￿i
i + " 8 v￿i in which
P
j6=i
vj 6= M ￿ 1 and vi = 1




vj = M ￿ 1 means exactly M ￿ 1 legislators other than li vote vj = 1.
Every legislator o⁄ered the above contribution schedule has one dominant strategy: vote
vi = 1. If exactly M ￿ 1 other legislators vote 1, he is pivotal and has a utility of at least
(he might be receiving positive e x
1;v￿i
i ) Li(z) + max[0;￿Li(z)] + e x
0;v￿i
i + " if he votes vi = 1
and a utility of Li(zq) + e x
0;v￿i
i = e x
0;v￿i
i if he votes vi = 0. He has a net bene￿t of at least
Li(z)+max[0;￿Li(z)]+" > 0 from voting vi=1. If not exactly M ￿1 other legislators vote 1,
he is not pivotal. If at least M other legislators vote 1, the outcome is z regardless from his
vote, and his utility gain in voting 1 is at least Li(z)+ e x
0;v￿i
i +"￿Li(z)￿ e x
0;v￿i
i = " > 0. If
at least M other legislators vote 0, the outcome is zq regardless from his vote and his utility
gain from voting 1 is at least 0 + e x
0;v￿i
i + " ￿ 0 ￿ e x
0;v￿i
i = " > 0. Therefore, for each of the
M + 1 legislators facing this contributions schedule, it is a best response to play 1.
Hence, at least M +1 legislators play 1 in the deviation from the candidate equilibrium.
The transnational lobby therefore will have to pay M + 1 legislators for the deviation, and
pay them what she had o⁄ered in the case in which strictly more than M￿1 other legislators
vote 1, since M + 1 will vote 1. This corresponds to b x0;v￿1 + ". However, when v￿1 has M
legislators other than li voting 1, no legislator is pivotal. By the de￿nition of consequential
strategies, b x0;v￿1 = 0. Therefore, the transnational lobby can obtain outcome 1 at the cost
(M + 1) ￿ "; where " is arbitrarily small.
Therefore, all equilibria respect the properties described in Proposition 5. 21
21In order to facilitate the intuition of the reader, we provide a simple example.
Example 1 Suppose N = 5;g6 = 6;g1=2=3=4=5 = ￿8;L1=2=3=4=5 = ￿7. The following is an equilibrium:
b x1=2=3=4=5 = 0 for all v, b x6;i =
￿
78 v in which vi = 1 and exactly 2 other legislators vote 1
0all other v 2 V ; b v =
(1;1;1;1;1).
No legislators is playing a weakly dominated strategy. If a legislator is pivotal and votes 1, he obtains
a bene￿t of 7 in contributions and of ￿7 in personal utiliy. If he is pivotal and votes 0, he receives 0 in
contributions and 0 in personal bene￿t. In both cases, his total utility is 0. If he is not pivotal, regardless of
his vote, he will receive 0 contributions and his personal outcome dependent utility can not be a⁄ected from
his vote. Hence he is indi⁄erent.
36Equilibrium when contributions are conditional on the vote of
the single legislator
Equilibrium concept
We look for subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibria.22
Results
We order all lobbies so that g1 ￿ g2 ￿ ::: ￿ gm￿1 ￿ gm ￿ ::: ￿ gn; and denote the median
lobby m to be the one associated with the median payo⁄ gm.
Proposition 6 For any proposal z and any status quo zq, there always exists an equilibrium
in which the transnational lobby obtains her preferred policy at no cost. Furthermore, there
is no equilibrium in which the transnational lobby does not obtain her preferred policy as long
as the transnational￿ s lobby bene￿ts from the policy are higher than the sum of disutility from
this policy, if any, of every possible combination of M legislators plus the disutility, if any,
of the median national lobby.
We establish the result by proving successive claims. Without loss of generality, assume
gN+1 ￿ 0. De￿ne " to be an arbitrarily small positive number. Claim 2 and Claim 3 still
hold, and their proof is unchanged.
Claim 13 There exists an equilibrium supported by a voting pro￿le in which at least M +1
legislators vote for 1, so the outcome preferred by the transnational lobby is chosen.
Proof. Take a voting pro￿le in which M +1 legislators vote vi = 1, the remaining legislators
vote vi = 0, contributions are xi = f0;0g 8i and xN+1;i = f0;0g 8i. No legislator li
has an incentive to deviate: since no legislator is pivotal, switching vote would not a⁄ect
the outcome and contributions would still be zero. Note that some legislators might be
playing weakly dominated strategies (i.e., if they were pivotal, they might be better o⁄
voting di⁄erently), but this might be the only equilibrium. No lobby has an incentive to
deviate. The transnational lobby is obtaining her preferred outcome for free, and hence will
not deviate. No national lobby can a⁄ect the outcome, since she can only in￿ uence the vote
of her corresponding legislator who is not pivotal.
Claim 14 Given a status quo zq and a proposal z, in an equilibrium of the game there is no
voting pro￿le in which at least M +1 (non pivotal) legislators vote for 0 (
N P
i=1
vi < M ￿1) if




Proof. Suppose there was an equilibrium with such a voting pro￿le. By Claim 3, every
legislator li is receiving zero contributions on the equilibrium path. Furthermore, every
li is also receiving zero contributions o⁄ the equilibrium path, otherwise li would deviate.
Therefore, in this candidate equilibrium, e xi = e xN+1;i = f0;0g8i. But then lobby N +1 could
o⁄er
22Since we are giving a su¢ cient condition, we do not need to use the equilibrium re￿nement
37xN+1;i =
￿
max[0;￿Li] + "for vi = 1




Each of these legislators has a payo⁄ of 0 + max[0;￿Li] + " if he votes 1 and is pivotal and
a payo⁄ of 0 if he is pivotal and votes 0. If he is pivotal, his best response is to vote 1. If
he is not pivotal, he receives always max[0;￿Li] + " if he votes 1, and zero if he votes 0,
hence voting 1 is a best response for each legislator o⁄ered this contribution schedule. There
always exist " small enough such that gN+1 ￿
P
M
max[0;￿Li] ￿ M" > 0 and lobby N + 1
is better o⁄. Therefore, there could not have been an equilibrium in which a supermajority
votes against the preferred policy of lobby N + 1. Note that we are providing a su¢ cient
condition. If we assume that all legislators believe they will not be pivotal even once they
observe a deviation, the transnational lobby can obtain a deviation for just " arbitrarily
small.
Claim 15 There does not exist an equilibrium voting pro￿le in which exactly M (pivotal)




Proof. Suppose there was such an equilibrium, called the candidate equilibrium. De￿ne
the set of M legislators voting against the proposal as Q. Then e vi = 0 8li 2 Q,e vi = 1
8li 2 fN=Qg. The N ￿ Q legislators voting 1 are not pivotal. By claim 3 they receive no
contributions to vote 1 on the equilibrium path. Contributions o⁄ered to vote 0 must also
be zero for these N ￿ Q legislators: Suppose there was a legislators who was o⁄ered by his
national lobby a positive contribution to vote 0. Since he is not pivotal, regardless of his
personal outcome dependent utility, he would have a positive deviation and hence he could
not have voted 1 in equilibrium. Therefore, for it to be an equilibrium, it has to be that
e xi = e xN+1;i = f0;0g for all li 2 fN=Q}.
By claim 2, e x0
i ￿ max[0,-gi] 8 li 2 Q: no legislator voting 0 in the candidate equilibrium
can be o⁄ered more than max[0,-gi] from lobby i to vote 0. But then lobby N + 1 could
o⁄er xN+1;i = fmax[0;￿Li] + ";0g 8li 2 fN=Qg (legislators that were voting 1 in the
candidate equilibrium) and xN+1;i￿ = fmax[0;￿gi￿] + max[0;￿Li￿] + ";0g to the legislator
li￿ among those voting 0 that is cheapest, li￿ = argminli2Q max[0;￿gi] + max[0;￿Li], and
o⁄er xN+1;i = f0;0g 8li 2 fQ=i￿g (to all remaining legislators). Legislators li 2 fN=Qg
(that were voting 1 in candidate equilibrium) have a unique best response: vote 1. If they
are pivotal in the deviation pro￿le, their net gain will be Li + max[0;￿Li] + " ￿ 0 ￿ 0 > 0,
if they are not pivotal in the deviation pro￿le, their net gain will be max[0;￿Li] + " > 0.
Legislator li￿ 2 fN=Qg, has a unique best response: vote 1. If he is pivotal, his minimum
net gain from voting 1 is Li￿ +max[0;￿gi￿]+max[0;￿Li￿]+"￿max[0;￿gi￿] > 0, if he is not
pivotal his minimum net gain is max[0;￿gi￿] + max[0;￿Li￿] + " ￿ max[0;￿gi￿] > 0. Note
that this is a minimum net gain for two reasons: e x0
i￿ ￿ max[0,-gi] and e x1
i￿ ￿ 0.
Hence, if the transnational lobby deviates in this manner, a majority of legislators votes
1 (all li 2 fN=Q} and li￿) and the new outcome will be z. The transnational lobby will
have a net gain of gN+1 ￿ max[0;￿gi￿] + max[0;￿Li￿] ￿
P
N￿Q max[0;￿Li] ￿ N": We show
this is positive. Order all lobbies so that gn ￿ gn+1. De￿ne the median lobby to be the
lobby associated to the median payo⁄ in this ranking, gm. De￿ne Lm to be the legislator
associated with the m0 th payo⁄ when ranking payo⁄s according to Ln ￿ Ln+1. Given that
38li￿ = argminli2Q max[0;￿gi] + max[0;￿Li], max[0;￿gi￿] + max[0;￿Li￿] ￿ max[0;￿gm] +
max[0;￿Lm]. Therefore, gN+1 ￿ max[0;￿gi￿] + max[0;￿Li￿] ￿
P













max[0;￿gm] is a su¢ cient condition to guarantee z is the outcome. However, it is not
necessary: there might be cheaper deviations when exactly M legislators are voting 0. For
example, rather than compensating N ￿ M legislators only for their personal preference
and one legislator for both his preference and the contributions from his lobby, it might
be cheaper to compensate more than one legislator for both contributions from lobbies and
personal utility. If we assume that legislators in the set N=Q will keep voting 1 because they
observe no deviation, the transnational lobby can deviate for an amount lower or equal to
max[0;￿gm]+max[0;￿Lm]. Furthermore, there might be equilibria in which national lobbies
are also contributing in favor of outcome z. 23However, the claim establishes su¢ ciency,
therefore a characterization of all possible equilibria is beyond the scope of the proposition.
23The example below illustrates the multiplicity of equilibria:
Example 2 Suppose N = 5. L1=2=3=4=5 = ￿7, g1=2=3=4=5 = +2, g6 = 18: Equilibrium 1 : x1=2=3=4=5 =
f0;0g, x61=62=63=64=65 = f0;0g, v = f1;1;1;1;1g: Equilibrium 2: x1=2=3=4=5 = f0;0g, x61=62=63=64=65 =
f0;0g, v = f0;0;0;1;1_ g: Equilibrium 3: x1=2 = f0;0g, x3=4=5 = f2;0g, x61=62 = f0;0g; x63=64=65 = f5;0g;
v = f0;0;1;1;1_ g: Equilibrium 4 : x1=2 = f0;0g, x3=4=5 = f1;0g, x61=62 = f0;0g; x63=64=65 = f6;0g;
v = f0;0;1;1;1g
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